University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Law School

12-2010

Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use
on Summary Judgment
Ned Snow
University of South Carolina - Columbia, snownt@law.sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44
U. C. Davis L. Rev. 483 (2010).

This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Judges Playing Jury:
Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding
Fair Use on Summary Judgment
Ned Snow*
Issues of fair use in copyright cases are today decided as pure issues of
law on summary judgment. But it was not always so. For two centuries,
juries routinely decided these issues in actions at law. The law recognized
that fair use issues were highly subjective and thereby inherently factual
— unfit for summary disposition by a judge. Today, however, all this has
been forgotten. Judges are characterizing factual issues as purely legal so
that fair use may be decided at summary judgment. Even while judges
acknowledge that reasonable minds may disagree on these issues, they
characterize the issues as legal, preventing them from ever reaching a
jury. This practice contravenes a history of fair use that precedes and
informs the Bill of Rights, suggesting that judges are now violating the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury. And by removing the jury from the
fair use analysis, judges have weakened the substantive doctrine,
ultimately diluting the strength of fair use expression. That dilution is
impinging on fair users’ First Amendment right of free speech. This Article
examines why courts have changed their characterization of fair use from
issue of fact to issue of law and the constitutional conflicts that have
resulted from that change. It proposes a return to the original conception
of fair use: a fact-intensive inquiry that preserves the constitutional rights
of free speech and the civil jury.

*
Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author
expresses appreciation to Professors Eugene Volokh, Stephen Sheppard, Tomás
Gómez-Arostegui, and Thomas Lee for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. The author also recognizes the valuable research assistance of Michael
Thompson and Christopher Warzecha.
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INTRODUCTION
For nearly two centuries, judges at common law refrained from
deciding issues of fair use in copyright cases, reserving these issues for
the jury.1 This was because issues of fair use raise subjective questions
over which reasonable minds often disagree; the subjectivity of fair use
placed these questions within the exclusive province of the jury.2
Thus, it was once well established that issues of fair use were factual
and that these issues should rarely, if ever, be decided on summary
judgment.3
Today, fair use is nearly always decided on summary judgment.4
Modern judges treat issues of fair use as pure issues of law, so that
even where reasonable minds may disagree on whether a use is fair,
the judge decides the issue rather than the jury.5 The very same issues
1
E.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.(b) (K.B.) 140 (Lord
Mansfield) (“In all these [copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying
work] the question of fact to come before a jury is, Whether the alteration be
colourable or not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or
not.”); Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680 (Lord Ellenborough) (“I
shall address these observations to the jury, leaving them to say, whether what so
taken or supposed to be transmitted from the plaintiff’s book, was fairly done with a
view of compiling a useful book, for the benefit of the public, upon which there has
been a totally new arrangement of such matter, — or taken colourable, merely with a
view to steal the copy-right of the plaintiff?”); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 62324 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, J.) (characterizing inquiry into whether use of
copyrighted material is permissible as “question of fact to come to a jury”); DC
Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing district
court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds that “the four factors
listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for
the jury”).
2
See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Summary judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts
have been reluctant to make subjective determinations.”).
3
See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-74 (2d Cir. 1946) (rejecting idea
of deciding copyright issues on summary judgment).
4
See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[I]t is well established that a court can resolve the issue of fair use on a
motion for summary judgment.”); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491
F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment for copyright holder
on issue of fair use); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-92 (7th Cir. 2005)
(same); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.
1998) (same).
5
See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 993, 997 (9th Cir.
1998) (interpreting case law as “rejecting argument that fair use is appropriate for
determination by summary judgment only when no reasonable jury could have
decided the question differently,” while affirming grant of summary judgment for
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which were once well established as factual for a jury are today purely
legal for a judge.6 The contradiction could not be more blatant.
Curiously, nothing has been said to justify this change. Over the
course of a few years, judges inadvertently adopted the present
approach of judicial disposition on summary judgment over the
historical approach of jury deliberation at trial.7 The change occurred
subtly and silently, going unnoticed both in court and in the
academy.8 Neither reasoned analysis nor thoughtful discussion
accompanied the change.9 This is troubling, especially because issues
of fair use affect speech rights: fair use represents constitutionally
protected speech.10 Moreover, the history of courts sending fair use
issues to the jury predates and informs the Bill of Rights, implying that
the Seventh Amendment mandates jury consideration.11 In short,
judges today are routinely bypassing the jury to the detriment of the
fair use doctrine, the defendants’ right of free speech, and the litigants’
right to a civil jury.
This Article calls for a return to the former classification of fair use
issues as inherently factual for jury consideration. Part I briefly
explains the fair use doctrine. Part II examines the question of
whether fair use issues should be classified as factual or legal. It
concludes that the nature of these issues demands their factual
copyright holder on issue of fair use); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc.,
955 F. Supp. 260, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[W]here the district court has ‘facts
sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors,’ it may conclude as a matter of law
that the challenged use is not a protected fair use.”), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (“It is
appropriate to dispose of the issue of fair use on a motion for summary judgment
because the Court has ‘found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory
factors.’ ”).
6
See discussion infra Part III (discussing historical change in characterization of
fair use from fact to law).
7
See discussion infra Part III.A (examining initial case law that gave rise to
changed characterization).
8
One scholar did allude to the change: a two-sentence passing reference arises in
a leading copyright treatise. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12.10[B][4], at 12-193 & n.115 (2009) (“[T]he older view is that the
issue whether similarity between two works is fair use presented a triable issue of fact.
Under the modern view . . . the court may resolve the fair use defense as a matter of
law on summary judgment.”).
9
See discussion infra Part III.A.
10
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as “free
speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation[]”); see also discussion
infra Part IV.B.
11
See discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A.1 (examining history of jury considering
issues relating to fair use and implications of that history under Seventh Amendment).
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classification. Part III recounts the history of juries deciding fair use
issues at common law and the shift to judges deciding those issues.
Part IV examines the constitutional implications of deciding these
issues on summary judgment, questioning whether judges are denying
litigants their Seventh Amendment right to a jury and whether judges
are threatening defendants’ First Amendment right of speech. The
Article concludes that judges should refrain from deciding fair use
issues on summary judgment.
I.

GENERAL BACKGROUND OF FAIR USE

Copyright law provides an author of expression a right to exclude
others from using that expression.12 This general right of exclusion is
not without limits, however.13 The right ceases where the use in
question is deemed to be fair.14 Authors, or copyright holders,15 may
control all uses of their expression that are not fair uses.16 Determining
whether a use is fair may, therefore, be dispositive to a copyright
holder’s claim of copyright infringement.
As a limit on copyright, the doctrine of fair use protects those
persons who use another’s expression without permission but in a fair
manner.17 Deciding what is fair can be difficult and complex, often
turning on circumstances unique to each case.18 For this reason, there
is no precise definition or test for fair use that will fit all situations.19
Fair use is instead intended to contemplate all factual circumstances
that could possibly justify a particular use of the expression.20
In the absence of a precise definition or test for fair use, the law sets
forth general guidelines that may be considered in determining
fairness.21 Specifically, the Federal Copyright Act lists four factors to
consider in determining whether a use is fair.22 These factors are
12

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
See id. § 107.
14
See id.
15
Any distinction between authors and copyright holders is irrelevant for the
purpose of this Article.
16
See id. § 107.
17
See id.
18
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985)
(“The endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in
particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the [fair use] statute.”).
19
Id.
20
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
21
See id.
22
See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Act does not specify who is to make this determination
13
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discretionary and non-exclusive: any of the factors might not be
weighed, and other factors not listed in the Act may be weighed, in
determining fairness.23 In practice, though, usually only the four factors
are considered.24 The first factor examines the purpose and character of
a defendant’s use, which includes an examination into whether the use
has transformed the original expression and whether the use serves a
noncommercial purpose.25 The second factor examines the nature of
the copyrighted work, where works of a more creative nature tend
against a finding of fairness and works of a more factual nature tend
toward a finding of fairness.26 The third factor examines the amount
and substantiality of the work that the defendant has used.27 The fourth
factor examines the effect that the defendant’s use has on the value of,
or a potential market for, the copyrighted work.28
Applying these factors to any given factual situation produces
inferences that speak to the extent that a defendant’s use may be fair.
For instance, applying the first factor to the situation where a person
copies excerpts from an author’s book for the purpose of critically
reviewing the book yields a possible inference that the copying has
transformed the copied expression: the copier’s critical analysis
potentially casts the copied expression in a new light and thereby
potentially transforms the copied expression.29 Such an inference that
arises in the four-factor analysis must be weighed and viewed in the
context of the other inferences that arise in that analysis.30 Depending
on the circumstances of a particular use, individual inferences may
weigh more or less heavily than other inferences.31 In the example of
copying excerpts from a book for a critical review, although that
circumstance might yield an inference that the use is transformative,

— judge or jury.
23
Id.; see, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th
Cir. 1997) (recognizing public interest in receiving newsworthy event as possible
factor in applying fair use); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
24
See 1 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING & THE ARTS § 1:25, at 1-99 (3d ed. 2007); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1125 (1990).
25
17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
26
17 U.S.C. § 107; Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
27
17 U.S.C. § 107.
28
Id.; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
29
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing criticism as example of fair use); Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 591-92 (noting likely fairness of critical review).
30
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
31
Id. at 590-91.
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that inference might not weigh much in the overall analysis if, for
instance, further inferences arose under the third and fourth factors
that the copied portion constituted the most substantial portion of the
book and that consumers purchased the critical review as a substitute
for purchasing the original work.32 The weight of each inference must
be determined in relation to the other inferences drawn in the fourfactor analysis. Traditionally, the inferences that arise under the first
and fourth factors — the degree to which the use is transformative and
the degree to which the use suggests a negative commercial effect —
have weighed heaviest in the analysis.33 Nevertheless, all inferences
must ultimately be weighed together to produce an affirmative or
negative answer to the question of fairness.34
II.

FAIR USE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Today disputes over fair use are nearly always decided at summary
judgment.35 In prior years, they were always decided at trial.36 The
reason for this difference is that courts have changed their
characterization of the inferences in the four-factor analysis — once
factual, they are now purely legal.37 Under Federal Rule of Civil
32

Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66
(1985) (rejecting argument that reporting newsworthy expression constituted fair use
on grounds that defendant used “heart” of copyrighted work).
33
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (explaining importance of first factor); Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (acknowledging importance of fourth factor).
34
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
35
See Electronic Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at 4 n.1, Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661-NG (D. Mass. July 14, 2009) (“[I]t is
clear that a strikingly large number of courts decide fair use at summary judgment.”);
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 554 (2008) (noting empirical trend demonstrating “remarkable
increase in the prevalence of fair use summary judgment opinions that began in the
mid-1990s and has continued to the present”).
36
E.g., cases cited infra note 190; see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, §
12.10[B][4], at 12-193.
37
See discussion infra Part III. Compare DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696
F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially
factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury.”), MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he issue of fair use is one of fact.”), and
Eisenschiml v. Fawcette Publ’ns, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957) (“[T]he issue
of fair use is a question of fact.”), with Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353
F.3d 792, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing first-factor inquiry into transformation
as legal issue), Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 14146 (2d Cir. 1998) (treating issues in four-factor analysis as legal, appropriate for
summary judgment), and Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)
(pronouncing inferences in four-factor analysis as being “legal in nature”).
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Procedure 56 (“Rule 56”), summary judgment is appropriate only if
no genuine issue of material fact exists; issues of law, by contrast, may
be resolved on summary judgment regardless of their complexity.38
Despite Rule 56’s teaching on the appropriateness (and
inappropriateness) of treating issues of law and issues of fact on
summary judgment, Rule 56 never sets forth any criteria for classifying
whether an issue is legal or factual.39 The classification is left to the
common law.
In the context of fair use, whether issues should be classified as legal
or factual is an important question because the inferences in the fourfactor analysis often raise issues that are close calls. Reasonable minds
often disagree over which of competing inferences in the four-factor
analysis should prevail and how much weight any particular inference
merits.40 In that analysis, choosing between competing inferences and
assigning a weight to those inferences requires judgments over which
reasonable minds often differ — judgments that are close calls.41 And
whereas issues of fact that raise close calls cannot be decided on
summary judgment, issues of law that raise close calls can.42 So when
judges once classified the inferences in the four-factor analysis as
factual, summary judgment was inappropriate under Rule 56 if
reasonable minds could disagree on the question of fairness.43 When
judges changed their classification of the inferences from factual to

38

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2725, at 410-12 (3d ed. 1998) (“The
fact that difficult questions of law exist or that the parties differ on the legal
conclusions to be drawn from the facts is not in and of itself a ground for denying
summary judgment.”).
39
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
40
See generally Leval, supra note 24, at 1106-07 (observing great disparity among
opinions on whether fair use applies).
41
Cf. Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform,
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (“The substantive emptiness of fair use
makes it something of a dumping ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t
manage in other areas.”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use
Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (2007) (“[S]cholars generally agree that it is now
virtually impossible to predict the outcome of fair use cases.”); R. Polk Wagner, The
Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 426-27
(2005) (“[T]here is little more that can be usefully said about the division between fair
and unfair uses in practice: The ‘know it when you see it’ nature of the analytic
approach in this context simply precludes such observations.”).
42
See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2725, at 410-12.
43
See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“The four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are
normally questions for the jury.”).
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legal, summary judgment became appropriate under Rule 56,
regardless of whether reasonable minds would disagree.44
As discussed below in Part III, this change in the classification of the
inferences arose without deliberation or reasoned analysis.45 Neither
courts nor scholars have ever provided any basis for changing the
classification of these inferences from factual to legal.46 The change
simply occurred. Overnight and without consideration, courts
discarded the centuries-old method for deciding fair use — the jury —
as they relabeled factual inferences to be conclusions of law.47
The change in characterization raises the question of whether courts
were correct to institute that change. This Part answers that question,
examining whether the inferences in the fair use analysis should be
classified as legal for a judge or factual for a jury. Section A provides
the context of those inferences as they relate to a defendant’s use of a
plaintiff’s work, briefly explaining the distinction between historical
facts and the inferences that arise from those facts. After that
explanation, Section B articulates arguments for classifying those
inferences as factual.48 It then addresses counterarguments purporting
that the inferences should be classified as legal.49 This Part ultimately
concludes that these inferences must be deemed factual for jury
consideration.
A. Historical Facts Underlying Inferences
Two types of issues exist in the fair use analysis.50 The first type
concerns what actually happened (e.g., what use the defendant
actually made of the work).51 The second type concerns whether what
happened suggests fairness (e.g., whether the use should be
considered transformative).52 The first type of issues are indisputably
fact issues for a jury.53 The second type represent issues that require
44
See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[I]t is well established that a court can resolve the issue of fair use on a
motion for summary judgment.”).
45
See discussion infra Part III.
46
See discussion infra Part III.
47
See discussion infra Part III.
48
See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
49
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
50
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183-84 (D. Mass.
2007) (drawing distinction between historical facts and interpretation of those facts).
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 12.10[A], at 12-185.
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the application of a legal principle to a factual circumstance.54 It is
these second type of issues over which disagreement lies regarding
whether they should be characterized as factual for a jury or legal for a
judge.55 Nevertheless, a brief explanation of the first type of issues
provides context for a discussion of the second type of issues.
As a general matter in every area of law, any issue is factual that
examines whether an action or condition has happened or existed.56
Such issues are often referred to as issues of historical fact in that they
represent questions regarding what happened in the past.57 In this
sense, a historical fact is objectively verifiable.58 Did the defendant pull
the trigger? What speed was the car going? What day did the
defendant enter onto the property? With sufficient evidence,
reasonable minds will reach only one answer to these issues of
historical fact.
Issues of historical fact arise in the fair use analysis. Consider the
proposition that a defendant copied the plaintiff’s work, that the
defendant used the work in a certain manner, or that the copyrighted
work appeals to a specific market of consumers — all these
propositions represent historical facts.59 Issues surrounding these
verifiable propositions are well recognized as factual in nature, i.e.,
historical issues of fact.60 In fair use, historical facts consist of the use
that a defendant has made of the copyrighted work as well as the
content, origin, and history of the copyrighted work.61 Because
54
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”).
55
Compare DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“[T]he four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are
normally questions for the jury”), with Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84 (“As to
fair use, the parties’ disagreements are over the interpretation of facts. As these are
questions of law, I analyze them below.”).
56
See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1995) (describing historical
fact as “a recital of external events”); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and
Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1924) (“The primary and popular meaning of the
word ‘fact’ is something which has happened or existed.”); Stephen A. Weiner, The
Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1869-70 (1966)
(describing question of fact as arising “[w]hen there is a dispute as to what acts or
events have actually occurred, or what conditions have actually existed”).
57
See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 109-10.
58
See Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE
L.J. 667, 668 (1949).
59
See Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84 (characterizing “material historical
facts” in fair use analysis as “the origin, history, content, and defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s [copyrighted work]”).
60
See id.
61
See id.
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historical facts represent objectively verifiable conditions or events, a
factfinder may draw only one conclusion as to the factual meaning of
evidence with a sufficient amount of evidence. So if a defendant
admits to copying a plaintiff’s work and identifies the copyrighted
work that belongs to the plaintiff, the factfinder may draw only one
conclusion as to the historical fact that the defendant has copied the
plaintiff’s work. Likewise, if a plaintiff and defendant agree on how the
defendant used the copy, the factfinder may draw only one conclusion
as to this historical fact. Thus, courts uniformly recognize that certain
issues in the fair use inquiry are factual in nature — issues of
historical fact.
If historical facts are ever disputed, they represent questions for the
jury.62 But in fair use disputes, historical facts are not usually
disputed.63 Defendants either admit or assume arguendo that they have
used the plaintiff’s work, and there is rarely dispute over the history,
content, or origin of the copyrighted work. But the inferences that are
drawn from these historical facts are greatly disputed. These inferences
arise in the four-factor analysis of fair use.64 Specifically, the historical
facts facilitate inferences as to the character and purpose of the use,
including the extent to which the use is transformative; the nature of
the copyrighted work (i.e., factual or creative); the significance of the
amount that the defendant has used; the extent to which that amount
constitutes a substantial portion of the work; and the potential market
impact of the use.65 Whereas historical facts are not usually disputed,
the inferences arising from those facts are often disputed.
B. Issues in the Four-Factor Analysis
As stated above, applying the four factors to the historical facts
yields inferences in the fair use analysis. Another way of stating this is
62

See 3 NIMMER, supra note 8, § 12.10[A], at 12-185.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84.
64
See, e.g., discussion supra Part I (explaining inferences in four-factor analysis).
65
The last inference — market impact — may be formed from the historical fact
of the history of a copyrighted work, which history would include its past
performance in the commercial market and the effect of the defendant’s use on that
performance. Although litigants may dispute the effect that has occurred, more often
it would seem they dispute the potential effect of the use. See, e.g., Peter Letterese &
Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1317 (11th Cir.
2008) (observing that copyright holder conceded that defendant’s use did not cause
harmful effect on market, but that question remained as to whether widespread use
like defendant’s use would result in adverse harm to potential market). The potential
use of the effect is not a historical fact, but rather an inference in the four-factor
analysis.
63
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that in applying the legal principles outlined in the statutory factors to
the historical facts, inferences arise that affect the ultimate issue of
whether the defendant’s use is fair.66 Choosing between competing
inferences, and their weight in the overall analysis, raises issues that
must be resolved. The appropriateness of resolving these issues on
summary judgment depends on whether they represent genuine issues
of material fact, or alternatively, issues of law.67 It is therefore
necessary to determine whether the inferences to be drawn from the
historical facts are factual or legal in the four-factor analysis.
The classification of issues that arise from applying a legal principle
to a historical fact is uncertain in the law as a general matter. If a
choice must be made among inferences that arise in applying law to
fact, that choice may be viewed as raising either a legal issue, a factual
issue, or an issue of mixed law and fact.68 In some instances, that
choice among inferences is referred to as an issue of fact for a jury; in
other instances as an issue of law for a judge; and in still other
instances as a mixed issue of law and fact for jury or judge depending
on the area of law.69 For example, consider the application of the legal
principle of reasonableness to factual circumstances in different
contexts: in the context of negligence, it is a question of fact as to
66
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome, Inc., 387
F.3d 403, 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable
inferences therefrom, when viewed through the lens of the statutory fair use factors,
support the jury’s fair use finding.”).
67
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
68
See NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly,
J.) (“The controversy whether application of established legal standards to raw
evidentiary material is a question of law or of fact is an old one.”); 9 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2550, at 640 (1981) (opining that it
is “possible only to indicate the trend of some of the main subjects of controversy or
difficulty” when contemplating whether interpretation of evidence falls to judge or
jury); Weiner, supra note 56, at 1872 (pointing out “constant difficulty” that courts
encounter in allocating decision-making between judge and jury). Compare James B.
Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 147, 169-70 (1890) (declaring
that mixed questions of law and fact constitute matters of fact for jury consideration),
with OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 97-99 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (arguing that experienced judges should determine
issues that require application of law to fact where facts under consideration arise
frequently). Compare 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2729, at 533-36
(outlining cases discussing factual nature of issues applying legal principle of
reasonableness to factual situation), and id. § 2730 (discussing actions where
application of law to fact in order to determine whether defendant has particular state
of mind is factual issue for jury), with id. § 2730.1 (discussing disparity in whether
issues treated as law or fact for summary judgment purposes in context of contract
interpretation).
69
See sources cited supra note 68.
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whether a defendant has acted reasonably where his action (or failure
to act) has injured a plaintiff;70 in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, it is a question of law as to whether police officers have
acted reasonably where their actions resulted in a seizure;71 in the
context of contract, it is a mixed question of law and fact as to
whether a defendant insurer has acted reasonably where it has refused
to pay a claim.72
The reason for the variance in classifying such issues is that the factlaw distinction ultimately depends on which institution — judge or
jury — is best able to decide the issue.73 In some areas of law, a judge
is better situated to resolve the issue; in other areas, the jury is better
suited to do so.74 The institution that is better able to apply law to fact
in a particular area of law determines whether the issues in that area of
law are deemed factual or legal.75 Thus, classification as factual or legal
turns entirely on whether the judge or the jury is the better institution
for resolving the type of issue.76
At this point it is well to pause and point out that lawyers generally
do not think of the fact-law distinction as turning on which institution

70
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 237 (5th ed.
1984) (“The question [of reasonableness in negligence] usually is said to be one of fact.”).
71
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 & n.8 (2007) (rejecting idea that question
of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment context is question of fact).
72
See, e.g., Ross v. Auto Club Grp., 748 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Mich. 2008) (“The trial
court’s decision about whether the insurer acted reasonably involves a mixed question
of law and fact.”).
73
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)
(“[W]hen an issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple
historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned
than another to decide the issue in question.”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14
(1985) (“[T]he decision to label an issue a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question of fact,’ or a
‘mixed question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of
analysis.”).
74
See 10A-B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, §§ 2729–33 (outlining
different types of actions in which courts may or may not entertain summary judgment
owing to which institution, judge or jury, is charged with applying law to fact).
75
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-90; Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
76
In some areas of law, courts disagree over which institution is best at resolving a
particular issue. For instance, in the probate context, courts disagree over the issue of
whether a defendant’s influence over a testator is undue. Some courts view this as an
issue of fact for the jury, others as an issue of law for the judge. Compare Bermke v.
Sec. First Nat’l Bank of Sheboygan, 179 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Wis. 1970) (rejecting
argument that jury should consider undue influence), with In re Estate of Opsahl, 448
N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that undue influence is question
of fact for jury).
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— judge or jury — is better able to resolve the issue at hand.77 In fact,
it seems a truism that whether the judge or the jury decides an issue
depends on whether that issue is legal or factual — not the other way
around.78 Nevertheless, in the context of issues that arise in applying
legal principles to historical facts, courts and scholars alike recognize
that the preference for judge or jury is the basis for the classification as
legal or factual.79 For instance, judges are thought to be a superior
institution to jurors in construing written instruments: a judge is
trained in meanings of words more so than ordinary citizens.80
Accordingly, contract issues surrounding the interpretation of
particular words are construed as legal.81 On the other hand, a jury is
thought to be a superior institution to a judge in understanding how a
reasonable person would act in everyday life because the jury
comprises more life experiences than does the judge.82 Accordingly,
issues that arise in applying the legal principle of reasonableness to
specific facts in a negligence suit are construed as factual.83 The same
can be said of conversion. The issue of whether possession is wrongful
requires life experiences to formulate a judgment of wrongfulness, and
collectively, the jury has more life experiences than does the judge: the

77
See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1.7, at 7 (3d
ed. 1996); Thayer, supra note 68, at 147.
78
See Thayer, supra note 68, at 147.
79
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384, 388-90 (comparing interpretive skills of judge
and jury in analyzing which institution should decide claim-construction issues of
patent law); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 148, at 354-55 (2000) [hereinafter
TORTS]; KEETON ET AL., supra note 70, § 32, at 237; LILLY, supra note 77, § 1.6, at 7;
10A-B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, §§ 2729–33; Bohlen, supra note 56, at
116; Weiner, supra note 56, at 1876 (“[I]t is meaningless to assign the task in a
specific case to judge or jury simply by use of the law and fact jargon, as courts have
done. A far preferable solution would be to . . . deal with it as such, not on the basis of
terminology, but on the basis of policy.”).
80
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (“The construction of written instruments is one
of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened
by training in exegesis.”).
81
See, e.g., Elec. Cable Compounds, Inc. v. Town of Seymour, 897 A.2d 146, 150
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (“[W]here there is definitive contract language, the
determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a
question of law.”). Where it is necessary to look outside the contractual language to
determine the parties’ intent, the issue becomes one of fact for a jury. See id.
82
See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2729, at 533 (noting
particular deference that courts accord jury in deciding issue of reasonableness in
negligence actions “in light of its supposedly unique competence in applying the
reasonable person standard to a given fact situation”).
83
See id.
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issue of wrongful possession in a conversion suit is therefore classified
as factual for the jury.84
It thus follows that because the issues arising in the four-factor
analysis of fair use represent issues that require the application of legal
principles to historical facts, those issues should be regarded as either
legal or factual based on which institution — judge or jury — is best
able to resolve them. The sections below examine arguments for both
institutions. Section 1 examines the arguments for the jury, and section
2 examines those for the judge. Both sections ultimately conclude that
the jury is the better institution for resolving these issues.
1.

Issues as Factual Matters for Jury

This section explains why the jury should decide the issues in the
four-factor analysis, thereby implying the factual classification of those
issues. The section sets forth three reasons: the first and chief reason is
that the characteristic of plurality among jurors is preferable to the
singularity of the judge in determining whether a use is fair; the
second is that the Seventh Amendment mandates these issues be
resolved by a jury; and the third is that the public appears to prefer the
jury to the judge.
a.

Jury Plurality

Issues of fair use should lie with the jury for the simple reason that a
jury comprises a plurality of individuals. The characteristic of plurality
is paramount in deciding fair use issues because of the nature of those
issues. As this section discusses, those issues require discretionary
judgment that is best exercised by an institution with a plurality of life
experiences.
Because fair use is a flexible doctrine, lacking a precise definition, it
is an inherently vague and indeterminate doctrine.85 The broad
84
See, e.g., McClendon v. DeVoll (In re DeVoll), 266 B.R. 81, 96 n.18 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2001) (reciting definition of conversion given to jury as “the unlawful or
wrongful exercise of the rights of possession, dominion, ownership or control by one
person over the property of another”); Tarrant v. Capstone Oil & Gas Co., 178 P.3d
866, 871 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (recounting that trial court, in requiring jury to
determine whether facts constituted unlawful conversion, defined conversion for jury
as “any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal
property . . .”) (emphasis added); 90 C.J.S. Trover & Conversion § 115 (2010) (“[T]he
question of whether the facts adduced in evidence establish an unlawful conversion is
usually a question to be determined by the jury.”).
85
See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1149 (2007)
(recognizing that certainty in rules of fair use would cost flexibility of its application);
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language that describes both the underlying legal standard of fairness
and its characteristics (e.g., transformative and substantial) requires
that the institution charged with applying these legal principles to the
historical facts exercise a good deal of discretionary judgment.86 Stated
another way, the indeterminacy of fair use requires that the judge or
juror who draws the fair use inferences inject her own view of what
should be considered fair.87 The inquiry becomes a normative question
of characterization, where the criteria employed to reach the correct
characterization consists of flexible, broad terms.88 Should the
defendant’s painting of the plaintiff’s photograph be considered
transformative?89 Should the amount that the defendant used be
considered substantial? These and other inquiries in the fair use
analysis require the decisionmaker to exercise discretionary judgment
and opinion.90
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1604 (1982) (“[T]he
ambiguity of the fair use doctrine and its statutory formulation obscure the underlying
issues and make consistency and predictability difficult to achieve.”); Jessica Litman,
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 338-50 (2002) (“[T]he question
whether individuals are liable for copyright infringement when they make
unauthorized uses of copyrighted works has no clear answer.”).
86
See generally Leval, supra note 24, at 1105-07 (noting vagueness of fair use
doctrine resulting in individualized judgments).
87
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and
Context, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 477, 526-27 (2007) (“What constitutes a transformative
use is potentially highly subjective.”); John Tehranian, Whither Copyright?
Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, BYU L. REV.
1201, 1252 (2005) (“[D]rawing the line between transformative and nontransformative uses is laden with subjectivity.”).
88
One evidentiary scholar has observed this phenomenon as a general matter in
applying legal principles to historical facts:
In these cases involving a broadly stated legal rule, the jury’s application of
law to fact involves a characterization of the [historical] facts in the light of
the jury’s collective experience and its interpretation of the indeterminate
language that constitutes the legal standard. In a sense, the jury is giving the
legal principles involved the necessary contextual precision to resolve the
case before them.
LILLY, supra note 77, § 1.7, at 8.
89
See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 11, Fairey v. Associated Press, No.
1:09-CV-01123-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009) (alleging that Hope painting of thenSenator Obama transforms Associated Press photograph of same image).
90
Depending on the historical facts of a case, at least some of the inferences in the
four-factor analysis usually turn on discretionary judgment and opinion. Of course
not every instance of applying legal principle to historical fact in the four-factor
analysis will yield an issue that is vague and indeterminate. Applying the legal
principle of commerciality to the factual situation where a defendant has sold copied
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The decisionmaker’s discretionary judgment and opinion will
depend on the decisionmaker’s social values, and social values vary as
greatly across society as do life experiences.91 Consider a defendant
who creates a sculpture that replicates a plaintiff’s copyrighted
photograph. Life experiences dictate whether a person recognizes
social value in the sculpted expression independent of the copyrighted
photograph: perhaps for those whose life experiences teach them the
significance of details and symbols, the sculpture begets a meaning
distinct from the copyrighted photograph; perhaps for those whose life
experiences teach them the principle that reward comes only by
independent work, the sculpture begets the same meaning of the
photograph.92 Accordingly, the choice among competing inferences in
the fair use analysis depends upon the life experiences of the
decisionmaker. Life experiences affect social values, social values affect
discretionary judgments, and discretionary judgments affect fair use
inferences.93 In short, the indeterminate nature of fair use requires
judgments that turn on individual social values and life experiences.
This insight suggests that a jury would better draw fair use
inferences than would a judge.94 Presumably, those inferences should
reflect as near a consensus of values and opinions across society, for
the ultimate judgment of fairness is accorded the respect and
deference of the entire society.95 The disparity of values and opinions
expression for profit in a retail store certainly does not result in a choice of competing
inferences with respect to the legal principle of commerciality: only one reasonable
inference may be drawn, i.e., that the defendant has made a commercial use. Some
factual circumstances give rise to inferences that most (if not all) reasonable persons
would draw under the governing legal principles. In those factual situations the
application of law to fact would appear to be straightforward.
91
See generally DOBBS, TORTS, supra note 79, § 18, at 33-34 (“[Juries] bring their
own knowledge of ‘social facts’ to bear on the case.”).
92
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 304-05, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992)
(rejecting view that purpose-and-character-of-use factor (transformation) suggested
fairness where defendant had created sculpture of puppies based on copyrighted
picture of puppies on postcard).
93
Cf. 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 636 (4th ed. 1853) (defining “common
law” as “that which derives its force and authority from the universal consent and
immemorial practice of the people”).
94
Cf. 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 15.2, at 351-52 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing fact-finding process of jury and noting room for consideration of
policy to choose between equally indemonstrable generalizations); Bohlen, supra note
56, at 113 (observing that mixed questions of law and fact regarding whether
defendant’s conduct was reasonable in negligence context raise social value judgments
of normative nature).
95
In Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), the Second Circuit
suggested a similar reason for jury consideration of copyright issues:
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in society is most likely to be reflected in a jury with its several
members than in a judge.96 Together, members of a jury represent a
greater breadth of unique life experiences than does a judge.
Moreover, any one juror’s opinion may not prevail without adequate
consideration of all other opinions — the host of life experiences
collectively producing a single opinion on fairness. If an opinion is
extreme in the view of the collective body, the jury divorces it,
stripping it of influence in its ultimate collective opinion. By contrast,
the judge need not reach a collective consensus as he derives values
and opinions from only his single set of life experiences. If his
opinions are extreme when compared to those of society, they
nevertheless remain reasonable to him. Hence, the diversity of life
experiences among several jurors, coupled with the process of
collectively reaching a consensus, is more likely to represent a
mainstream view of society’s diverse cultural norms and social values
than is the set of personal life experiences of any single judge. If a
judge resolves fair use issues as a matter of law on summary judgment,
one person’s life experiences control the relevant cultural standard of
fairness; if a jury resolves those issues at trial, a plurality of life
experience controls that standard, and such a plurality more likely
reflects the views of society.97 A jury’s plurality view better captures
the correct standard for fairness than a judge’s singular view.
The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so
much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff. Surely,
then, we have an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.
96

See generally DOBBS, TORTS, supra note 79, § 18, at 33-34.
The Supreme Court’s comment in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664-65 (1873), is instructive on this point:
97

Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education
and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant,
the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their
separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a
unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great
effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.
...
. . . [W]hen the facts are disputed, or when they are not disputed, but
different minds might honestly draw different conclusions from them, the
case must be left to the jury for their determination.
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Other areas of law further suggest the superiority of the jury over
the judge at deciding issues involving discretionary judgments that
turn on value and norm assessments.98 Consider the issue of whether a
defendant breached his duty of care in negligence: the jury determines
whether the defendant’s conduct is reasonable, or in other words,
whether the defendant should have acted differently.99 Or consider the
issue of whether a defendant converted another’s property: the jury
determines whether the defendant’s possession was wrongful.100 Or
consider the issue of whether a defendant acted in good faith: the jury
determines whether the defendant’s thoughts were appropriate when
he committed an act.101 Jurors routinely resolve issues that require
discretionary judgment based on social values and cultural norms.102
Fair use should not be any different.
An example of the problems that arise where a judge, rather than a
jury, decides the issue of fair use arises in the case of Clean Flicks of
Colorado v. Soderbergh.103 There, the defendants edited content of
movies that consumers found objectionable, deleting incidents of sex,
nudity, profanity, and violence, in order to produce — from the
defendants’ viewpoint — a more socially acceptable version of the
movies.104 To edit the content, the defendants made an edited copy of
an original authorized copy, and then they bundled both the original
copy and the edited copy together for sale to the consumer.105 The
copyright holders sued for infringement; the defendants argued fair
use.106 On summary judgment, Judge Richard Matsch ruled for the
plaintiffs despite the defendants’ argument that factual disputes
required a jury trial.107 On the issue of transformation, Judge Matsch
found there to be “nothing transformative about the edited copies”

98
See DOBBS, TORTS, supra note 79, § 148, at 355 (“Because part of the jury’s role is
to make normative decisions or value judgments, courts do not normally grant
summary judgment on negligence issues, even if the facts are undisputed.”).
99
Id. § 148, at 354-55; Bohlen, supra note 56, at 113 (describing controlling
question for jury in deciding issue of reasonableness in negligence case as “not what
is, but what ought to be”).
100
See sources cited supra note 84.
101
Weiner, supra note 56, at 1871; e.g., Galbreath v. Scott, 433 So. 2d 454, 457
(Ala. 1983) (identifying question of whether expenditures were made in good faith as
question of fact).
102
See supra notes 84, 99, 101.
103
Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).
104
Id. at 1238.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1237, 1239.
107
Id. at 1237-38.
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that the defendants had created.108 For Judge Matsch, the defendants’
use was equivalent to creating a verbatim copy of the entire movie and
then deleting only a few random blips in that copy.109
Judge Matsch’s life experiences apparently fell short of teaching him
the reasonableness of the inference that the defendants’ use was
transformative.110 It appears reasonable that by deleting objectionable
content, the defendants had created something new — a more socially
desirable version. For a juror whose life experiences include those of a
parent who protects his children from morally offensive content, the
defendant’s use may have transformed the original expression; the use
would have permitted children to view movies that their parents
would not have otherwise allowed them to view.111 Judge Matsch,
108

Id. at 1241.
See id.
110
One can only speculate as to which life experiences may have influenced Judge
Matsch’s conception of whether the use was transformative. Prior to his appointment
to the bench by President Nixon, Judge Matsch served as a federal prosecutor, a city
attorney, and a member of the U.S. Army in its counter-intelligence unit in Korea. 1
ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11-13 (2009) [hereinafter ALMANAC]. One
newspaper has noted that Judge Matsch’s upbringing was strict: his parents expected
him to work two hours in the family store each day following school, and after the
store work, his mother held daily homework sessions at the kitchen table. See Virginia
Culver, Trial Judge Mixes Seriousness and Wit, DENVER POST, Apr. 15, 1997, at A-01.
These experiences could have shaped Judge Matsch’s view of life so that he adopted
the following principle: legal and proper conduct must rigidly adhere to a governing
rule. This principle Judge Matsch lives. He runs a tight courtroom, starting court at
precisely 9:00 a.m., entering the room at 8:59 a.m. See Patrick E. Cole, Don’t Mess
With Richard Matsch, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 35. No one is allowed in after he enters.
Id. He has been described as an intolerant curmudgeon with quirky rules. See 1
ALMANAC, supra, Tenth Circuit, at 13. He keeps in shape by running every day — for
the past several years. See Culver, supra, at A-01. He eats alone at law conventions to
avoid any potential conflict of interest. Cole, supra, at 35; Culver, supra, at A-01.
Judge Matsch’s analysis on the fair use issue of transformation is consistent with his
apparent view that proper conduct requires rigid adherence to rules. Rigid application
of the Supreme Court’s definition of transformation — as something that “adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning or message” — suggests that the defendant’s use of the
movies lacked any degree of transformation, for although by presenting a more
socially acceptable version of the original work the defendants’ use suggested a further
purpose, different character, and new message, that use did not add anything to the
original work because it only deleted content — so reasoned Judge Matsch. See Clean
Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (relying on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). Rigid rule application — a principle in opposition to fair use
and one that Judge Matsch experiences, lives, and applies — blinded Judge Matsch
from seeing the reasonableness of a contrary inference.
111
See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (labeling as “inconsequential”
argument that parents value defendants’ editing of content because use allows families
109
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however, failed to comprehend that deleting certain content could
ever transform a work because of his rigid application of the Supreme
Court’s definition of a transformative work — namely, a work is
transformative if it “adds something new” to the original work; Judge
Matsch reasoned that by deleting content the defendants had failed to
add something new to the original work.112 He failed to appreciate the
view that the defendants had exercised valuable judgment in deciding
which portions to delete, judgment that distinguishes their use from
arbitrary content deletion.113 From his standpoint, content editing was
not even minimally transformative.114 From a juror’s standpoint, the
use may well have been entirely reasonable.115
An implication of this basis for choosing jury over judge — jury
plurality — is worth noting. The weight of each inference in the fair
to watch movies together that they otherwise could not).
112
Id. at 1241 (relying on Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)). By Judge Matsch’s reasoning, then, deleting one word from a sentence would
neither transform the expressional content nor communicate a different meaning.
“This sentence is not false” would be no different from “This sentence is false.”
113
The value of deleting only blips from a movie lies not in the quantum of deleted
content, but rather in the judgment to appreciate which blips to delete so as to make
the expression more socially acceptable while preserving the underlying idea and
theme.
114
Another case illustrating the danger of relying on judicial views of
reasonableness is Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). There, the defendant
created a sculpture of puppies based on a postcard picture of puppies in which the
plaintiff held a copyright. Id. at 304-05. The defendant argued that the purpose of the
sculpture was to comment on the commonplace of life, which would suggest fairness.
Id. at 309-10. Both the trial and appellate courts, however, concluded that no
reasonable jury would view the first factor of fair use, which speaks to the element of
transformation, as favoring fairness, ultimately finding infringement. Rogers v. Koons,
751 F. Supp. 474, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 960 F.2d 301, 310-12 (2d Cir. 1992).
Yet a picture on a postcard and a sculpture of the same picture seem transformative
from the fact that the form of the expression has changed. Further, the distinction
between a common postcard and an expensive sculpture, which sold for over a
hundred thousand dollars, suggests a distinction in meaning, i.e., transformation. It
therefore seems entirely possible that a reasonable jury could have considered the
defendant’s use as transformative, suggesting fairness.
115
In addition to the first factor, the fourth factor — market impact — Judge
Matsch held as not favoring fair use. Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. He reached
this conclusion on the basis that the studios were targeting an audience that was
distinct from the one Clean Flicks was targeting. Id. This reasoning is curious. That
the studios were withholding their expression from a sort of audience suggests that a
flaw existed in the market for the expression — indeed a complete market failure —
which fact usually suggests a finding of fairness, especially in view of the fact that
Clean Flicks’s use provided the studios market value for the copies used. See generally
Gordon, supra note 85, at 1615, 1618 (concluding that fair use is appropriate where
market failure exists, especially where harm to copyright holder is small).
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use analysis should also be construed as a factual matter for jury
consideration.116 Factor weight determines the degree of importance of
each inference in the ultimate decision of whether a use is fair. Like
the inference itself, the importance of the inference is subject to
discretionary judgment. That discretionary nature of the issue raises a
normative question: how important ought this inference be in the
overall analysis? The answer turns on discretionary judgment and
opinion, which are formed by life experiences. Consequently, the
institution with greater life experiences is more likely to reflect
society’s view of factor weight. The jury, with its plurality of life
experiences, is thus preferable to the judge in deciding issues related
to how to weigh each inference in the analysis.
b.

Seventh Amendment

The Seventh Amendment provides that “the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.”117 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
Amendment to mandate a civil jury today only if at the time of the
Seventh Amendment, a civil jury resolved disputes over similar rights
existing at common law.118 At the time of the Seventh Amendment,
courts recognized that issues of fair use were definitional to the
common-law right of copyright, and so courts reserved these issues for
the jury.119 Part III.A below discusses this history, and it recounts that
in the late twentieth century, when judges began deciding these issues
as a matter of law, they departed from the original practice of sending
the issues to the jury.120 Hence, to preserve the right of trial by jury as
it existed in 1791, judges must recognize the historical mandate of the
Seventh Amendment that juries decide fair use issues. And by

116

See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:60 (2009) [hereinafter
COPYRIGHT] (“The trier of fact hears all evidence, makes factual determinations about
the credibility and weight to be given to that evidence, weighs all four factors in light
of those factual findings, and comes up with a judgment based on applying the law to
the facts found.”); see, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 80
(2d Cir. 1997) (“Our own viewing of the episode would incline us to weight the third
factor less strongly toward the defendants than did Judge Martin, but we are not the
fact-finders . . . .”).
117
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
118
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708-09
(1999).
119
See discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A.1.
120
See discussion infra Part III.A (observing that fair use existed as principle that
was definitional to legal right of copyright in 1769, implying its eligibility for jury
consideration).
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requiring that the jury decide these issues, the Seventh Amendment
requires them to be considered issues of fact.
Moreover, by requiring the right of trial by jury to be preserved, the
Seventh Amendment appears to articulate a preference for juries where
uncertainty exists as to whether judge or jury should decide an issue.121
Preservation of a right requires that in situations where it is unclear
whether the right applies, the right should apply.122 That is,
preservation requires that uncertainty favor application. Hence, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved only if that right is presumed in
cases where it is unclear which institution should decide an issue.123
Preservation implies presumption. The Seventh Amendment, therefore,
intimates a preference for jury over judge where ambiguity surrounds
which institution should decide an issue. Even assuming that it were
uncertain whether juries or judges decided issues of fair use in 1791,
the Constitution mandates that that uncertainty favor juries.
c.

Public Preference

A final reason for preferring jury to judge is that the public seems to
prefer the jury in fair use cases. Public preference is likely in favor of a
jury in fair use because a juror, unlike a lawyer or judge, represents
the ordinary person off the street.124 As in other areas of tort law, it
seems that the public would prefer one of its own — a layperson — to
make the subjective determination of whether a member of the public,
in attempting to create something new, has appropriated expression of
another. Judges’ continuous treatment of such issues creates a
potential for rigidity and bias that is oblivious to the human element

121
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; cf. Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation:
The Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 400
(1995) (noting presumption in favor of juries that Seventh Amendment creates in
context of examining issue of whether juries should assess damages).
122
See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959)
(noting that usual discretion of judges to determine whether to try legal or equitable
causes first is “very narrowly limited” because of constitutional right to jury trial, such
that “only under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims”).
123
Cf. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 148-60 (2007) (contrasting summary procedures of 1791 to present-day
summary judgment and concluding that present-day summary judgment is
unconstitutional).
124
Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 70, § 37, at 237 (explaining that normative
judgment of reasonableness in negligence law “is to be determined in all doubtful
cases by the jury, because the public insists that its conduct be judged in part by the
man in the street rather than by lawyers”).
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of the conduct at issue.125 Such rigidity and bias carries harsh
consequences in the form of statutory damages that are punitive-like
in nature.126 Unsuccessful attempts at fair use become very costly for
members of the public, so the public preference for a jury would seem
strong.127 The jury serves as a sort of shock absorber to cushion the
impact of copyright’s unforgiving and severe nature.128 The judge
represents justice where the public prefers understanding.
2.

Issues as Legal Matters for Judge

This section considers arguments in favor of construing the issues in
the four-factor analysis as legal in nature for a judge to decide. Three
general arguments are considered: first, that judges are especially
qualified to decide these issues because of their experience in deciding
policy matters; second, that judges would provide consistency and
certainty in the law; and third, that jurors are especially ill qualified
because of both their likely partiality toward defendants and their
general inexperience dealing with the complexities of fair use.
a.

Policy Implications

Fair use issues often raise policy considerations, and a role of judges
is to consider the policy implications of their decisions.129 In fair use,
125
Cf. Bohlen, supra note 56, at 116 (explaining reason that juries determine
standard of reasonableness in negligence actions is because of “the public’s desire to
have its conduct judged by the layman . . . rather than by the more sophisticated and
expert judgment of the trained lawyer, whose judicial experience may have given him
a biased point of view”).
126
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (contemplating penalty for each act of
infringement from anywhere between $750 to $30,000, and up to $150,000 if willful);
17 U.S.C. § 504 (Historical and Statutory Notes) (“[B]y establishing a realistic floor
for liability, the provision preserves its intended deterrent effect.”); L.A. News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]wards of
statutory damages serve . . . punitive purposes.”).
127
Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 70, § 37, at 237 (citing this reason as basis for jury
determination in negligence context).
128
See id. (“[T]he jury serves as a shock-absorber to cushion the impact of the
law.”). Some uses must be deemed fair, although they do not fit nicely into the
statutory four-factor analysis. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1871, 1903 (2007) (arguing that zone of personal use is uncontroversially
noninfringing — such as downloading programs on TiVo and forwarding email —
and that these uses do not fit well within statutory fair use analysis). The jury, it
would seem, is the mechanism that provides the necessary zone of safety for such fair
uses that do not fit nicely into the four-factor analysis.
129
See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV.
899, 948-49 (2009) (observing that social policy should affect determinations that
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policy questions arise regarding whether a finding of fairness will
promote further creative expression.130 The policies underlying
copyright — providing incentives to original authors and fostering
creativity that builds on prior expression — must be balanced in
reaching a determination of fairness.131 Because judges routinely
consider policy implications of their rulings, and because the
inferences in the four-factor analysis contemplate policy, it might be
argued that judges are better equipped than juries to draw those
inferences.
This argument is questionable. As an initial matter, it is unclear that
judges are inherently better at deciding policy than are jurors.132 As
between citizens and judges, the democratic system of government
values the popular opinion of its citizens (i.e., through the legislature)
over the opinion of its judges when social policy decisions are
necessary.133 Although judges may consider policy matters more often
than citizens, this fact does not imply that judges are better at deciding
policy matters: ordinary citizens may enjoy a perspective on a policy
issue that a judge lacks.
Yet even assuming that judges are better than juries at
contemplating the policy implications of a fair use decision, policy
implications are secondary to the central consideration in determining
fairness — a constitutional mandate to protect fair use as speech under
the First Amendment. The central consideration in the fair use
analysis is whether the use should be protected as speech.134 In some
circumstances, the act of repeating another’s expression should be
judges make); cf. Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under
the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1160 (2003) (arguing that inferences
should be classified as legal if they raise questions relating to likely actions of persons
made aware of litigation outcome).
130
See William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit,
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 667-68 (1993) (noting
“fundamental public policies at stake” in determining fair use).
131
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (explaining that policy
underlying copyright is to provide incentives for authors to create and disseminate
ideas).
132
Cf. McCoy v. Thorn, 451 F. Supp. 351, 352 (W.D. La. 1978) (“Independent
policy determination by a court violates the principle, embodied in the Constitution
and proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, that a political sovereign derives
its power solely from the people.”).
133
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)
(recognizing that courts must defer to legislative view where legislature has spoken,
and where legislature has not spoken, Court must defer to agency’s view because of
agency’s “greater familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circumstances”).
134
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219, 221 (describing fair use as “free speech safeguard[]”
and “First Amendment accommodation[]”).
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protected as its own act of speech, and fair use is the doctrine that
allows for an identification of those circumstances.135 Fair use
subsumes speech interests that may restrain copyright’s ability to
suppress a defendant from repeating copyrighted expression.136 If the
fair user has a speech interest in repeating copyrighted expression, fair
use is the doctrine through which she may realize that interest.137 To
be sure, fair use represents a speech-protective doctrine.138
Because fair use is a speech-protective doctrine, the jury should
determine whether a use is fair.139 The jury is better suited than the
judge to identify the speech value underlying fair use expression
because the ability to identify speech values turns on the ability to
identify social values and cultural norms of society;140 it does not turn
on the ability to assess policy implications of particular expression.141
135

See id.; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-66 (1998) (arguing that copying
another person’s expression constitutes speech); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell,
Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J.
2431, 2433-34, 2466-70 (1998) (arguing for speech procedural protections to apply to
fair use expression).
136
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219, 221; Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d
624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The First Amendment adds nothing to the fair use
defense.”); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir.
2003) (“First Amendment concerns in copyright cases are subsumed within the fair
use inquiry.”).
137
See Chi. Bd., 354 F.3d at 631 (“The First Amendment adds nothing to the fair
use defense.”); Elvis, 349 F.3d at 626 (“First Amendment concerns in copyright cases
are subsumed within the fair use inquiry.”).
138
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219, 221.
139
Cf. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (“It is not the function of our Government to keep the
citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government
from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only when the censors are
better shielded against error than the censored.”).
140
The role of cultural norms and social values in speech theory and doctrine is
pervasive. The marketplace-of-ideas theory reflects the social value that society has
placed on truth. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (articulating marketplace-of-ideas speech theory as “best test of truth”).
The speech theory of human dignity represents the social values that society places on
personhood. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.5 (2010) (outlining human dignity theory of
free speech). The speech theory of democratic self-governance represents the social
value that society places on a form of government. See generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (explaining
democratic self-governance theory of free speech). Similarly, exceptions to an absolute
speech protective doctrine reflect cultural norms as to the types of expression that
merit protection (e.g., fighting words, obscenity, false defamation).
141
Leaving the decision with judges to assess whether a defendant’s use should be

2010]

Judges Playing Jury

509

Consider expression in another speech context — indecency.142
Protecting a particular indecent expression may reflect bad policy if
that particular expression will likely result in undesirable effects:
showing an adult movie might attract persons who are more likely to
engage in criminal activity.143 Yet this policy implication is irrelevant
in determining whether the particular indecent expression merits
protection as speech.144 The particular indecent expression merits
protection regardless of its negative policy implication. Its protected
status derives from its value as speech, which value is based on social
values and cultural norms.145 Social values and cultural norms
distinguish indecent expression from obscene expression — the
former protected and the latter unprotected. Tellingly, the institution
that the law entrusts to draw this indecent-obscene distinction is the
jury: the jury identifies whether expression is protected as indecent or
unprotected as obscene.146 Thus, the jury is better able to identify the
cultural norms and social values that speak to the presence or absence
of value in such expression.147
Just like the distinction between obscene and indecent expression,
in copyright the distinction between an infringing use and a fair use
protected as speech would place the government in control of a fundamental cultural
institution for exchanging ideas — the institution of criticism and comment of
another’s ideas. Such an outcome the law disfavors. See Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d
798, 806 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[T]he government may not pass speech
restrictions in an effort to preserve its own notions of valued American culture.”).
Judges deciding whether to protect expression based on policy considerations would
seem to represent the government acting as “the great censor and director of which
thoughts are good for us.” See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330
(7th Cir. 1985).
142
See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“Sexual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”).
143
See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (recognizing
reasonableness of city ordinance restricting adult movie theater locations based on, in
relevant part, intent to prevent crime).
144
The fact that policy considerations are irrelevant in deciding whether a
particular expression should be protected as indecent does not imply that policy
considerations cannot affect the time, place, or manner of protection generally
extended to indecent speech. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, 54 (permitting zoning
regulation of adult theaters based on their “secondary effects,” as permissible time,
place, or manner restriction).
145
See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973) (looking to social
values and cultural standards of lay jurors to determine whether expression
constitutes unprotected obscenity or mere indecency).
146
See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977) (requiring jury to
determine community standards for judging whether expression merits speech
protection in obscenity context); Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
147
See sources cited supra note 146.

510

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 44:483

turns on whether the use has value as speech.148 And like indecent
speech, the speech value of fair use expression is determined by social
values and cultural norms.149 With its broader array of life experiences,
the jury includes the views of several jurors, reflecting social values
and cultural norms of society better than the singular nature of a
judge’s views — in the contexts of both indecent and fair use
speech.150
Thus, the fact that a judge may, and a jury may not, recognize policy
implications of inferences in the four-factor analysis should not be the
basis for choosing between judge and jury. That a judge is best able to
assess the policy implications of providing incentives to authors does
not imply that a judge is best able to identify the speech value
underlying fair use expression. In the fair use analysis, an ability to
assess social values and cultural norms is more valuable than an ability
to assess policy implications. Speech protection matters more than
policy consideration.151 As the institution best able to identify relevant
social values and cultural norms, the jury should decide the issues in
the four-factor analysis.
b.

Legal Consistency

A second argument for judges to decide fair use issues is that judges
would provide consistency and certainty in the law of fair use.152

148
See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair
use doctrine.”).
149
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
150
It is of course possible that the speech nature of fair use might require a judge
to protect a defendant’s use from the jury. A role of judges is to protect unpopular
views from majority censorship. Where jurors discriminate against fair use expression
based on their disagreement with the expression’s content — rather than
considerations of fairness, i.e., the four factors — the jurors represent a majority
seeking to silence unpopular speech. In that circumstance, the constitutional
obligation of the judge to protect a minority’s constitutional right of free speech
should enable the judge to rule for the defendant as a matter of law. This Article,
however, addresses only the general question of whether fair use represents a question
of fact or law for the jury or judge, absent extraordinary circumstances. In a
forthcoming article, the Author will explore such circumstances where judges may
decide fair use as a matter of law.
151
Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (“[T]he
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the
table.”).
152
Cf. Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 135, at 2442-44 (arguing that issues of
substantial similarity in copyright law should be determined as matter of law at trial
and on appellate review based on “refinement of the legal standard”).
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Rulings on issues of law create binding precedent.153 Consequently, if
fair use issues were issues of law, their resolution by judges would
create precedent, ensuring certainty with regard to subsequent
conduct. By contrast, if these issues were deemed factual for a jury,
one jury could deem a certain use fair, whereas another jury could
find the same use to be infringing.154 The state of fair use law would
seem to lie in disarray: whether a use was fair could be anyone’s guess.
For the sake of consistency and certainty, then, these issues should
arguably be legal, and thus, reserved for judges to decide.155
This basis for favoring judges over juries is not altogether
persuasive. With regard to novel uses of copyrighted expression,
uncertainty will continue to abound regardless of which institution
decides the issue.156 Judges bring no greater certainty to yetundecided, novel questions of fair use than do juries. Indeed, during
the last few decades in which judges have treated fair use as a legal
question, the doctrine has become ever more uncertain and
unpredictable.157 Simply put, judges do not share a consensus view on

153
See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214-15 (8th ed. 2004) (defining both
precedent and binding precedent).
154
Elementary notions of justice suggest that if society deems a type of behavior as
permissible today, then absent notice otherwise, society should deem that same type of
behavior as permissible tomorrow. See HOLMES, supra note 68, at 123-24 (arguing that
similar facts should give rise to same normative judgment, suggesting legality of issue).
155
This argument draws support from another intellectual property area — patent
law. The Supreme Court has recognized that issues of claim construction in patent law
should lie with the judge for the sake of legal consistency. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996). By placing claim-construction issues
with a judge, the law provides certainty to future inventors as to whether a similar
product constitutes a non-infringing advancement or an infringing equivalent. The
legal nature of the issues demarcates certain boundaries of inventions, ultimately
giving rise to increased productivity in the marketplace of inventions.
156
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting that
fair use requires case-by-case analysis); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (describing process of determining whether use is fair as “the
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle and
refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent”); Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing
World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 133, 134 (2003) (discussing “indeterminacy” of
fair use judgments); Leval, supra note 24, at 1106-07; David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them
All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 278-84 (2003)
(demonstrating unpredictable nature of fair use doctrine through means of statistical
analysis).
157
See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 41, at 1496 (observing that judicial
attempts to define fair use “have failed unconditionally” and that “hope that a
common understanding would emerge over time did not materialize”).
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the meaning of fairness.158 Fair use as an issue of law begs for as much
clarity as fair use as an issue of fact.
With regard to uses that are not novel, the certainty argument is
stronger. Assuming a sufficiently similar use, a litigant could predict
whether her use was fair based on past judicial decisions. For instance,
case law has well established that recording a television show on a
VCR159 and displaying thumbnail images on a search-engine site are
fair uses;160 likewise, case law has well established that sharing music
files through peer-to-peer networks is not a fair use.161 Treating the
issues as a matter of law would, therefore, seem to provide certainty to
future users as to the fairness of the use.
The primary function of the fair use doctrine protection of speech
— protection of speech — diminishes the strength of the above
argument. The speech-protective function of fair use requires that
each particular use under consideration be decided on its own
merits.162 Indeed, it is a fundamental tenet of fair use that each use in
question raises its own consideration of fairness; each use potentially
raises circumstances that might raise an element of speech requiring
protection as a fair use. Case-by-case consideration ensures that no
circumstance is overlooked that might justify characterizing a
defendant’s repetition of expression as the defendant’s own act of
speech.163 Through this case-by-case application, inferences drawn in
the four-factor analysis necessarily lack precedential value.164 Thus,
158
As Judge Leval observed in his landmark law review article, Toward a Fair Use
Standard:

Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions
provide little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are
commonplace. The opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning
of fair use. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem
rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns.
Leval, supra note 24, at 1105-07.
159
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984).
160
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719-25 (9th Cir. 2007);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817-22 (9th Cir. 2003).
161
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2001).
162
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
163
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as
“free speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation”).
164
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(explaining that each fair use case “must be decided on its own facts”); Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (“[A]s soon as
literal appropriation ceases to be the test [for copyright infringement], the whole
matter is necessarily at large, so that, as what recently well said by a distinguished
judge, the decisions cannot help much in a new case.”).
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the case-by-case nature of the fair use inquiry necessarily limits the
implication of inferences drawn in any particular case: inferences
drawn in one case are not binding on a subsequent case.165 In short,
the speech nature of fair use implies that the doctrine necessarily
should be somewhat limited in its precedential effect; it is intended to
be somewhat unpredictable.166
Of course this case-by-case principle does not imply that previous
fair use opinions are entirely irrelevant in future fair use cases. For
instance, the Supreme Court’s teaching in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. on the fairness of recording a television
show through home-use VCR technology must be relevant in deciding
similar cases.167 Fair use opinions may establish principles as a matter
of law to guide the fair use analysis, and at the same time, the issue of
fair use may remain an issue of fact for a jury. Appellate courts may lay
down general principles to teach future factfinders the correct
methodology for finding facts in similar situations, and trial courts
may provide legal instructions that guide juries.
In this manner, the relationship between judge and jury in fair use is
akin to the same relationship in takings law in that both the inquiry
into whether a use is fair and the inquiry into whether a government
act amounts to a taking represent ad hoc factual inquiries.168 Appellate
opinions are not binding on decisions of lower courts with regard to
the particular findings of future factfinders; yet appellate opinions may
provide binding legal instruction as to the methodology for the

165
Just as yelling “fire” is permissible in some circumstances but not in others, so
also is copying an expression of a copyright holder permissible in some circumstances
but not in others. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes,
J.) (“[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”), with Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (“What would be a ‘fair use’ in one case might not be in
another.”).
166
Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.9 (1973) (noting that even if juries
may reach different conclusions as to whether expression merits speech protection in
obscenity context, constitutional rights are not abridged because “one of the
consequences we accept under our jury system” is that “different juries may reach
different results”).
167
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55
(1984). Would the holding of Sony apply to recording television shows on a Digital
Video Recorder? See Ned Snow, The Tivo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate
Copyright Law, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 81-83 (2005) (contemplating distinction
between recording television show on DVR and VCR that suggests copyright
infringement despite Sony holding).
168
See infra note 169.
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factfinding process.169 In this regard, the verbiage of legal instruction
— in either an appellate opinion or a trial jury instruction — may
suggest the fairness of a use in question. For example, the Supreme
Court declared in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. that to the extent a
use transforms its underlying work, other factors in the analysis that
suggest against fairness should be considered less significant than they
otherwise might be considered.170 Based on this declaration, a trial
judge might instruct the jury as follows: “The extent to which the
defendant’s use is deemed transformative of the plaintiff’s work will
decrease the significance of factors tending to suggest infringement.”
Such an instruction would provide a general guideline for the jury, but
it would not bind the jury to find a particular expression to be fair, nor
would it even bind them to weigh heavily the transformative factor.171
On the other hand, an appellate court’s opinion may provide much
more specific teaching on how a factfinder should weigh factors in the
analysis under specific circumstances. Consider the Ninth Circuit’s
169

The fair use analysis represents an ad hoc inquiry. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (analysis of fair use claim must be made on
case-by-case basis); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489
(2d Cir. 1960) (test for infringement of copyright is necessarily “vague” and
determinations must be made “ad hoc”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (1990),
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953 (“[T]he doctrine of fair use . . . requires ad hoc
determinations.”). The takings analysis also represents an ad hoc inquiry, where
appellate decisions are not binding on decisions of lower courts with regard to the
particular findings that are made, but they do provide binding legal instruction as to
the methodology for making the findings. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1005 (1984) (“The inquiry into whether a taking has occurred is essentially an
‘ad hoc, factual’ inquiry. The Court, however, has identified several factors that should
be taken into account when determining whether a governmental action has gone
beyond ‘regulation’ and effects a ‘taking.’ ”).
170
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579:
The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether and to what
extent the new work is “transformative.” Although such transformative use is
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.
(citations and footnotes omitted).
171
See PATRY, COPYRIGHT, supra note 116, § 10:60. Even after Campbell, judges
themselves (without reserving the issue for a jury) have found a use to be
transformative yet reached a conclusion that the use was not fair. E.g., Castle Rock
Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 268, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d,
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (admitting transformative nature of defendant’s use, but
finding use to be unfair).

2010]

Judges Playing Jury

515

decisions in Kelly v. Arriba and Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, both of
which provided legal instruction as to how to perform the factfinding
process in the four-factor analysis where a defendant has produced a
copyrighted work on a search engine.172 In both cases, the court held
that the transformative nature of the thumbnail image required a
finding of fairness.173 Consequently, in a future thumbnail-image case,
a court might find that a reasonable jury could reach no other finding
but that the use is fair. For on two occasions, the Ninth Circuit’s
specific instruction about the proper methodology for interpreting and
weighing the fair use factors in the particular situation where a
defendant displays thumbnail images through a search engine seemed
to leave no room for a reasonable factfinder to reach any conclusion
other than that such a use of thumbnail images must be fair.174 In such
an instance, where an appellate court’s legal instruction is specific
with regard to a particular situation, summary judgment would be
appropriate: no reasonable jury could find otherwise given the legal
instruction from an appellate court.
Certainty for future uses that resemble past uses may, therefore, be
achieved where an appellate court chooses to articulate specific
instruction that should guide a particular situation. Where the
appellate court determines that specific circumstances should trigger a
finding of fairness as a matter of law, or perhaps determines merely
that those circumstances should trigger an interpretation and weight
of a particular factor, trial courts become bound to make the
appropriate finding of fact.175 But absent such legal instruction, the
finding of fact remains an open question. The certainty that appellate
courts may provide to future uses will depend, ultimately, on the
language that those courts employ to define the scope of the use and
to articulate the methodology of the analysis. For instance, the
language of Sony appears to leave no room to interpret recording a
television show on a VCR for home use as anything but a fair use,176
172

See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719-25 (9th Cir. 2007);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817-22 (9th Cir. 2003).
173
Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 719-25; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817-22.
174
Perhaps, however, there is room for a finding of infringement. In both cases, the
court left open the possibility that commercial harm to the plaintiff might result in a
different finding. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 719-25; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817-22.
175
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-85, 588, 592-93 (establishing that
circumstances suggesting parodic nature of use should weigh heavily in favor of
finding fairness); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 44755 (1984) (establishing that recording television shows for home use is fair as matter
of law).
176
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-55.
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whereas the language of Campbell appears to leave ample room to
interpret the reproduction of lyrics in a song as either fair or
infringing.177 The jury decides questions left open by the legal
principles that appellate courts set forth.
It should further be noted that treating fair use as a factual issue
does not limit the ability of appellate courts to provide legal
instruction. Consider again appellate cases in takings law: they
demonstrate that appellate courts have ample opportunity to articulate
principles that should guide the ad hoc factual inquiries of the trial
courts.178 Moreover, the doctrine of independent review obligates
appellate courts to employ de novo review of factual findings that
affect litigants’ constitutional rights,179 and fair use affects defendants’
right of speech.180 So a verdict that denies fair use affects the
defendant’s speech rights, thereby obligating appellate courts to apply
independent de novo review to ensure that those rights are not
violated.181 Hence, construing fair use as an issue of fact for a jury does
not imply any less certainty in the judge-made law of fair use.
177
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (“While we might not assign a high rank to the
parodic element here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could
be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree.”).
Compare id. (recognizing potential for fair use of rap artist’s use of plaintiff’s song,
Pretty Woman), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267
(6th Cir. 2009) (upholding jury verdict finding infringement, rejecting fair use,
despite “small elements of [plaintiff’s funk] song” being used in defendant’s hip hop
song and distinction between song markets of plaintiff and defendant).
178
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
179
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984)
(requiring judges to perform independent review where constitutional liberty, such as
speech, turns on ultimate finding of fact).
180
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as
“free speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation[],” and suggesting
First Amendment violation if Congress altered “traditional contours” of copyright law).
181
Professor Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell argue that the trial court should
perform independent review in copyright cases on summary judgment. See Volokh &
McDonnell, supra note 135, at 2443-44. They argue in the context of the substantialsimilarity issue that the trial judge should decide the issue at summary judgment
under the principle of independent review. See id. Why wait for the appellate court to
review if the trial court already observes a constitutional liberty that needs protecting?
This argument seems to have merit in the fair use context, but only insofar as a
constitutional right needs protecting — the very basis for applying independent
review. In fair use, the only constitutional right that needs protecting is the
defendant’s right to speak, for the copyright holder’s right to speak is not threatened
by removing an incentive. Hence, it seems plausible for trial courts to perform
independent review on summary judgment, but only to protect the speech right of the
defendant. Under this reasoning, it would seem permissible to treat fair use issues as
legal for a judge to decide only where the defendants’ constitutional right of speech
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Jury Incompetency

It might be argued that judges, rather than juries, should decide
these issues on the ground that juries are incompetent at deciding fair
use issues. The incompetency argument is twofold: first, the jury may
lack experience in analyzing fair use issues; second, the jury may be
partial to defendants. With respect to the first incompetency
argument, the average juror likely has no experience in applying legal
principles of the fair use doctrine. That inexperience might deprive the
juror of insight necessary to perform the intellectual rigors of the fair
use analysis. With respect to the second incompetency argument, it is
possible that jurors may be partial to defendants because the jurors
might benefit from a finding of fair use. For instance, if jurors were to
find that uploading music files onto a peer-to-peer file-sharing
network was a fair use, those very jurors would benefit from their own
finding because such a verdict would allow them to download the very
files at issue. Relatedly, a juror may be unable to appreciate the social
value of protecting monopoly rights of copyright holders who are large
corporations, especially where those corporations are suing common
individuals. The average juror, then, may lack competency from the
standpoint of experience and impartiality.
These two criticisms against jurors do not appear sufficient to prefer
judge over jury. With regard to experiential competency, it is
questionable whether experience or familiarity with the law of fair use
provides any advantage in drawing the inferences.182 In assessing an
expression’s meaning, life experiences seem more valuable than legal
experiences.183 Moreover, the history of reversals and dissents in
judicial opinions on fair use suggests that jurors could not be any less
capable than judges at drawing the inferences.184 With regard to
merits protection: only then would summary judgment be appropriate for defendants
as a matter of law. It would not be appropriate for the plaintiff, however. Such an
outcome would be analogous to the procedure employed in defamation law, where
courts never entertain a motion for summary judgment for a defamation plaintiff, but
do recognize the importance of summary judgments for defamation defendants. See,
e.g., DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267 (N.J. 2004) (recognizing appropriateness
of summary judgment for plaintiff). This possibility will be developed further in
another article by the Author. See discussion infra note 150.
182
See discussion and authorities cited supra notes 157, 158.
183
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
184
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994)
(reversing appellate court’s reversal of district court’s finding of fair use on summary
judgment); On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing district
court’s summary judgment ruling that defendant’s use was fair); Worldwide Church of
God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
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impartiality, it is a dubitable assumption that judges are any less
influenced by personal biases and habits than are jurors.185
Furthermore, the contention that juries will impartially favor
individuals over corporations is, as an empirical matter, simply
unsupported.186 As a general matter, juries appear to rule just as
favorably for large corporations as they do for individuals.187 Thus,
jury incompetency does not seem a reasonable basis for preferring
judge over jury.
III. THE HISTORY OF JURIES IN FAIR USE
For over two centuries, fair use was an issue of fact for the jury
when cases arose in common-law courts.188 As far back as the mid
1700s, the issue in a common-law court consistently rested with juries
— not judges.189 And for two hundred years that followed, those
common-law courts consistently upheld the tenet that juries decide
issues of fair use.190 In the recent past, however, courts have begun to
185

That judges’ personal habits might create a conflict of interest that influences
their judgment, even if unintentionally so, seems a practical reality — even for the
most respected of judges. See also discussion infra Part IV.A.2.b (positing that
personal biases of judges may influence their judgment in fair use cases). Compare
United States v. U.S. District Court, 858 F.2d 534, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski,
J.) (recognizing mistake-of-fact defense for producer of obscenity where federal statute
required strict-liability punishment), with Scott Glover, Judge Alex Kozinski Recuses
Himself from Obscenity Trial, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at B-1 (explaining Judge
Kozinski’s admission that he views and posts pornographic material to Internet and
reporting that this fact caused Judge Kozinski to recuse himself from considering
obscenity appeal).
186
See, e.g., Jury Verdict Form at 17-20, Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06cv-1497 (MJD/RLE) (D. Minn. June 18, 2009) (expressing jury verdict of $1.92
million fine for defendant’s copyright infringement by downloading twenty-four
songs); see also Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of
Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 352-53 (1998) (concluding through
empirical study that jurors do not disproportionately favor individuals over
corporations).
187
See sources cited supra note 186.
188
Of course this is not to say that copyright suits, along with the issue of fairness,
arose only in actions at law. As Professor Gómez-Arostegui aptly points out, copyright
suits arose in equity before they arose at law. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What
History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1222-23, 1273 (2008) (explaining copyright
suits that arose in courts of chancery after 1660 and copyright suits in courts of law
after mid 1700s).
189
See cases cited supra note 1; discussion infra Part III.A.
190
E.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982)
(reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds that
“[t]he four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are
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ignore this tenet, ultimately leading to judges now treating fair use as a
pure issue of law: judges now decide fair use on summary judgment
regardless of whether reasonable minds may disagree on the inferences
to be drawn in the four-factor analysis.191
A. The First Two Hundred Years
1.

English Common Law

Fair use traces its roots to the inception of copyright. As early
English courts of law shaped the contours of the copyright doctrine,
they necessarily shaped the contours of non-infringing copyright uses,
what today is fair use.192 As early as 1769, those early English cases
indicate that the issue of whether a use infringes a copyright, or
alternatively whether the use is fair, should lie with a jury.193 One early
normally questions for the jury”); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070-71 (2d Cir.
1977) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on grounds
that “determination whether the use under these circumstances was substantial should
have been made by the trier of fact in the light of all relevant facts”); Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 472-74 (2d Cir. 1946) (rejecting idea of deciding fair use on summary
judgment); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1143-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying summary judgment on grounds that “the applicability of the
fair use defense is ordinarily a factual question for the jury to determine”), aff’d, 672
F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(deciding that treating fair use on summary judgment would be premature); see also
Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Summary
judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts have been
reluctant to make subjective determinations . . . .”); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 138, at 599-600 (1976) (opining that issue of fair use presents questions
of fact and, thus, should not be determined on summary judgment).
191
See cases cited supra note 4.
192
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-18 (2d ed.
1995) [hereinafter FAIR USE PRIVILEGE] (tracing history of fair use).
193
In Millar v. Taylor, Justice Aston described “many circumstances” that could
defeat a copyright action, and explained that the jury would consider those
circumstances. Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 225. No other judge in
the case took issue with this explanation from Justice Aston. See id. at 201-66. In
Campbell v. Scott, the court described the jury’s role in an earlier case, Roworth v. Wilkes,
(1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.) — although the Roworth court did not describe that
role:
Roworth v. Wilkes was a case in which 75 pages of a treatise consisting 118
pages were taken and inserted in a very voluminous work . . . and although
the matter taken formed but a very small proportion of the work into which
it was introduced, the jury found for the Plaintiff, who was the author of the
treatise.
Campbell v. Scott, (1842) 59 Eng. Rep. 784 (K.B.) 787 (emphasis added).
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case that articulates this principle is Sayre v. Moore, an action at law in
1785.194 There, the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield,
sat as the trial judge in a copyright dispute over the defendant’s use of
the plaintiff’s sea charts.195 The plaintiff had expended great resource
to create the charts, and the defendant had altered them to create his
own.196 On these simple facts, Lord Mansfield opined that the case
raised “a matter of great consequence to the country.”197 He noted
competing policy considerations in rewarding ingenuity and labor and
encouraging improvement and progress.198 Then, citing other
copyright actions (e.g., histories and dictionaries), he summarized the
general sort of dispute as follows: “In all these cases the question of
fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or
not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or
not.”199 Indisputably then, Lord Mansfield considered the issue of
whether a defendant’s use was permissibly fair or impermissibly
infringing to be one of fact for the jury.200 After expressing this, he
informed the jury that if they believed the defendant’s alterations to be
“various and material,” they should find for the defendant, but if they
believed the use to be “a mere servile imitation,” they should find for
the plaintiff.201 The jury then found for the defendant.202
Like Chief Justice Lord Mansfield in Sayre, Chief Justice Lord
Ellenborough in Cary v. Kearsley, an 1803 English copyright case,
recognized the central role of the jury in deciding the issue of fair use:
I shall address these observations to the jury, leaving them to
say, whether what so taken or supposed to be transmitted
from the plaintiff’s book, was fairly done with a view of
194
Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B.) 138 n.b, 140. Sayre v. Moore
has well influenced copyright jurisprudence in the United States. Many cases have
either quoted or relied on Sayre v. Moore to teach principles of fair use or copyright
generally. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
480 n.33 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1975); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sherriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d
769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006); New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576,
597 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oaks, J., concurring); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d
1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986).
195
See Sayre, 102 Eng. Rep. at 140.
196
See id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
See id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
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compiling a useful book, for the benefit of the public, upon
which there has been a totally new arrangement of such
matter, — or taken colourable, merely with a view to steal the
copy-right of the plaintiff?203
Here, it seems undeniable that Lord Ellenborough was contemplating
principles underpinning the modern doctrine of fair use. Nor can it be
doubted that he believed the jury to be the appropriate institution for
deciding that issue.
But of course not all judges of that era sent the fair use issue to the
jury.204 Where copyright disputes arose in courts of equity, judges
would decide all issues, whether legal or factual, because courts of
equity need not employ a jury to decide issues of fact.205 The right to a
jury is relevant only where the proceeding arises in a court of law, and
the test for whether a proceeding arises at law or in equity usually
turns on the remedy sought — damages or an injunction.206 The
203

Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680. Modern federal
jurisprudence continues to rely on Cary v. Kearsley for teaching principles of fair use.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Cary
v. Kearsley (Lord Ellenborough) to delineate principles of fair use); Antioch Co. v.
Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Minn. 2003) (same); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (relying on
Cary v. Kearsley to articulate fair use), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Hayden v.
Chalfant Press, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 303, 312 n.17 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (same). And in
American copyright jurisprudence generally (outside of fair use), Cary v. Kearsley has
further proven influential. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 613
(1834) (relying on Cary v. Kearsley in copyright suit).
204
Examples of early English courts deciding the issue of fair use without sending
it to the jury are the following: Macklin v. Richardson, (1770) 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.)
453; Amb. 694, 696 (No. 341) (rejecting principle that critical review may supplant
work itself where defendant had transcribed play and published it in magazine);
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.) 271; Amb. 403, 405 (No. 212)
(“No certain line can be drawn, to distinguish a fair abridgment; but every case must
depend on its own circumstances.”); Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017
(Ch.) 1020; 3 Swans. 672, 681 (“A fair abridgement would be entitled to protection
[from copyright action of the plaintiff].”).
205
See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION,
§ 2.6(2) at 104 (1993) [hereinafter REMEDIES]; 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 31, at 21 (Little,
Brown & Co., 12th ed. 1877); id. §§ 930–933, at 120-21; cases cited supra note 205. In
the early fair use case of Gyles v. Wilcox, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, sitting in equity,
spoke out against using a jury at law to determine whether the defendant had
infringed. Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490-91. Tellingly, he
referred to the issue as one of fact. See id. (“The court is not under an indispensable
obligation to send all facts to a jury . . . .”).
206
See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(3), at 106; 1 STORY, supra note 205, §
31, at 21; 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
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upshot is that because the right to a jury existed only at common law,
not in equity, juries did not decide all fair uses cases during this era.207
2.

Federal Common Law

In the United States, the fair use doctrine flourished as courts adopted
English common law.208 As part of that adoption, early fair use
jurisprudence in the States — the foundation for the present fair use
doctrine — relied on,209 and indeed quoted from, the portions of
English case law that mandated jury consideration of fair use.210 For
instance, in Emerson v. Davies, Justice Joseph Story211 articulated
principles of fair use by quoting Lord Mansfield’s admonition in Sayre v.
Moore: “In all these cases the question of fact to come to a jury, is,
whether the alteration be colorable or not. . . . [U]pon a question of this
nature the jury will decide, whether it be a servile imitation or not.”212
Likewise, in Simms v. Stanton, the court quoted the same declaration
from Sayre v. Moore, i.e., that the issue of fair use represented a
“question of fact to come before a jury.”213 Early fair use jurisprudence
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 794, at 122 (Little, Brown & Co., 12th ed. 1877) (“[I]t is far
better that [a damages remedy] should be ascertained by a jury than by the conscience
of an equity judge.”). This makes just as much sense today as it did centuries ago.
Consider the present Copyright Act, which contemplates both injunctive and damages
remedies: the silence brought about by an injunction does not seem as extreme or as
punitive as the thousands (or even millions) of dollars of debt that a defendant may
face under the statutory damages provision. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 504(a) (2006).
And where the remedy represents such an extreme financial penalty, a jury seems
preferable. See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217,
220-22 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying defendant’s fair use argument on summary
judgment); Jury Verdict Form, Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (No. 03CV11661NG) (awarding $22,500 per Internet use for thirty files downloaded).
207
See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(2), at 104.
208
See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901) (Story, J.) (relying on English case law in articulating principles of fair use).
209
Two early American fair use cases that relied on the English case of Cary v.
Kearsley were Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 11 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896), and Lawrence v.
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
210
See, e.g., Simms, 75 F. at 9 (quoting relevant portion of Sayre v. Moore); Emerson
v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623-24 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, J.) (same).
211
Justice Joseph Story is arguably the jurist who has most influenced the doctrine
of fair use in the United States. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
575 (1994) (“For as Justice Story explained . . . .”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (relying on Justice Story’s teachings and
suggesting that he was first to articulate modern principles of fair use doctrine); Leval,
supra note 24, at 1105 (quoting Justice Story in order to explain doctrine of fair use).
212
Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 623-24.
213
Simms, 75 F. at 9.
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in the United States expressly adopted the English common law’s
approach to reserving the question of fair use for the jury.
Despite this express adoption of English common law, courts in the
United States usually did not employ a jury in deciding copyright
cases involving fair use.214 Although federal case law contemplating
fair use endorsed juries in written opinion,215 juries in the United
States were absent in early fair use cases. The reason for their absence
was simple: early fair use cases, and indeed most copyright cases
generally, arose in equitable proceedings.216 Any damages under the
Act at that time were seen as incidental to the equitable remedy of an
injunction that would prevent continued infringement, and so equity
was most common.217 Under the now-abolished rule that equitable
courts may determine legal issues that are incidental to equitable
issues, courts of equity could determine fair use issues.218 Moreover,
equity entertained the remedy of an accounting of profits that
defendants had gained through their infringing use,219 which could be
greater than the sole remedy afforded by the Copyright Act of 1790 —
fifty cents in damages per infringing page.220 For many copyright
holders, lost profits represented the better remedy, so they sought
relief under a bill of equity rather than an action at law.221 The
214

But see Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 625 (giving defendant option of having case tried
by jury).
215
See Simms, 75 F. at 9; Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 623-24; cf. West Publ’g Co. v.
Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1910) (opining that given extent
of testimony already taken in equitable proceeding before court, it would make no
sense to transfer case to court of law with jury for plaintiffs to pursue their damages
remedy, regardless of fact that court of equity has decided to deny injunctive relief).
216
See 1 STORY, supra note 205, §§ 930–933, at 120-21 (explaining basis for ruling
on copyright claim in equitable proceeding).
217
See West Publ’g, 176 F. at 838-39 (explaining circumstance wherein equitable
court could award damages); 2 STORY, supra note 206, § 794, at 122.
218
The Supreme Court abolished this rule in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
470 (1962). After Dairy Queen, federal courts were required to submit all legal issues
to a jury. Id. at 472-73. If an injunction (an equitable remedy) and statutory damages
(a legal remedy) are sought, the present Copyright Act requires courts to submit the
issue to the jury. See id. at 472-73 (“[W]here both legal and equitable issues are
presented in a single case, ‘only under the most imperative circumstances [such as a
timely need for adjudication or an improper demand], circumstances which in view of
the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to
a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.’ ”).
219
See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(3), at 107-08.
220
See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (providing remedy
for infringement in “the sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in [the
infringer’s] possession”).
221
See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940)
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equitable nature of the desired remedy precluded any jury
consideration.
Actions at law that contemplated fair use, which would call into play
jury consideration, did not arise in the United States until the 1940s.222
The reason that copyright holders began to sue at law rather than in
equity at this time may have reflected a procedural change introduced
by the first version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
promulgated in 1938. With the Rules of 1938 came the new, efficient
means for copyright holders to prevail on their claims — summary
judgment.223 Summary judgment provided a speedy method for
adjudication without a plaintiff incurring the expense of the usual
equitable proceedings.224 According to the 1938 Advisory Committee
Notes, summary judgment was available for actions at law, suggesting
that it was not available for bills in equity.225 As a result, in the early
1940s, three copyright cases involving fair use are recorded in which
the plaintiffs brought their claims as actions at law.226
In none of these three 1940s cases did the court employ a jury.227 In
one case, American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, the court
dismissed the case through summary judgment.228 It is unclear,
(explaining that in copyright suits, recovery of profits “had been given in accordance
with the principles governing equity jurisdiction, not to inflict punishment but to
prevent an unjust enrichment by allowing injured complainants to claim ‘that which,
ex aequo et bono, is theirs, and nothing beyond this’ ”); id. at 402 (“Both the Copyright
Act and our decisions leave the matter to the appropriate exercise of the equity
jurisdiction upon an accounting to determine the profits ‘which the infringer shall
have made from such infringement’.”); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d
145, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (emphasis added) (“This is a suit for the alleged
infringement of a copyright, and the usual injunctive relief with an accounting is
prayed for.”), aff’d, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
222
See Am. Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); Karll v. Curtix Publ’g Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941); Broadway
Music Corp. v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
223
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 marked the first
time in the United States that use of the summary judgment procedure was authorized
in all civil actions.”).
224
See generally 1 STORY, supra note 205, § 31, at 21 (explaining process of judicial
discovery in equitable proceedings).
225
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee note (“[Summary judgment] is now used in
actions to recover land or chattels and in all other actions at law.”) (emphasis added).
226
See Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. at 147; Karll, 39 F. Supp. at 836; Broadway Music, 31
F. Supp. at 817.
227
See Karll, 39 F. Supp. at 837-38 (finding fair use of plaintiff’s song lyrics on
motion to dismiss, where defendant magazine published them as part of historical
commentary); Broadway Music, 31 F. Supp. at 818-19 (same).
228
See Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. at 147.
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however, whether the court considered the issue of fair use as a pure
issue of law or alternatively, as an issue of fact that a reasonable jury
could decide only one way.229 In the two other cases, the courts did
not grant the defendants summary judgment under Rule 56; rather,
both courts granted the defendants a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).230
This is significant because previous to the Federal Rules of 1938,
courts could grant motions to dismiss only in equitable proceedings.231
And the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 12(b) suggest that that the
1938 Rules adopted the motion to dismiss for its equitable nature
rather than the legal proceeding of demurrer.232 This suggestion that
12(b)(6) involved an equitable proceeding might have further
mistakenly233 suggested to a judge that Congress intended to curtail
plaintiffs’ right to a jury.
Other courts contemplating the issue of fair use during the 1940s
continued to openly recognize the factual nature of the issue.234 In the
1944 case of MacDonald v. DuMaurier, the plaintiff alleged
infringement of her copyrighted story and novel, and the defendant
moved for judgment on the pleadings.235 The only issue on the motion
was whether the defendant’s borrowing of expression constituted a fair
use.236 The district court granted the motion, holding that it did
indeed constitute a fair use; on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.237
229

See id.
See Karll, 39 F. Supp. at 837-38; Broadway Music, 31 F. Supp. at 817.
231
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee note (expressing preference for
equitable procedure of motion to dismiss rather than legal procedure of demurrer);
1912 Equity Rules R.29, reprinted in JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY
RULES 189 (6th ed. 1929).
232
See supra note 231.
233
Such a suggestion would have been mistaken because the distinction between
equity and law continued to turn on the remedy that a plaintiff sought rather than the
procedure for summary dismissal that a defendant employed. See generally DOBBS,
REMEDIES, supra note 205, § 2.6(3), at 106; 1 STORY, supra note 205, § 31, at 21.
234
See, e.g., Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir.
1943) (“As fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all the evidence in the
case, so, likewise, is the question of infringement one of fact to be solved by a study of
the evidence.”); N.Y. Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that “[i]f and when
‘fair use’ constitutes a defense is to be determined by consideration of all the evidence
in the case”); cf. Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D. Or. 1940) (“A jury trial was
waived by the parties . . . . Whether the trail [sic] was at law or in equity is thus
extremely technical, since the procedure of the new rules was used in all other matters
and the judge heard the evidence by consent of all parties.”).
235
MacDonald v. DuMaurier, 144 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1944).
236
Id. at 700-01.
237
See id.
230
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The majority panel of the Second Circuit (Judge Learned Hand and
Judge Swan) expressed concern that unconscious influences might
affect a judge’s view of the fair use issue, which would deny litigants
their right to a jury.238
The 1946 decision of Arnstein v. Porter is also notable.239 There, the
pro se plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed his
copyrighted song.240 The district court found his allegations to be
“fantastic,” and so it granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.241 The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that because the
plaintiff had sought for damages, the suit constituted an action at law,
and so the litigants were entitled to a jury.242 The majority panel of the
Second Circuit (Judge Learned Hand and Judge Frank) examined
whether summary judgment was appropriate to determine whether the
defendant had engaged in “permissible copying,” or alternatively,
“unlawful appropriation.”243 The majority explained that the issue
turned on whether the defendant had taken from the plaintiff’s work
that which was pleasing to lay listeners — an inquiry identical to the
third fair use factor examining the substantiality of the defendant’s
copying.244 Because of the nature of this inquiry, the majority
articulated that the case raised “an issue of fact which a jury is
peculiarly fitted to determine.”245
Although the Arnstein court did not employ the term “fair use” to
describe this issue of “permissible copying,” the two doctrines appear
similar in substance, if not distinct in name only.246 Yet regardless of
any distinction between the two doctrines, courts eventually construed
Arnstein as prohibiting summary judgment in copyright cases
238

See id. at 701.
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
240
Id. at 467. Plaintiff, Ira Arnstein, is characterized as an eccentric and deranged
songwriter. Although his songs never found popular fame, he filed five separate
lawsuits against popular recording studios and composers, alleging plagiarism of his
musical work. All were unsuccessful. Arnstein struggled financially during this time.
See Cary Ginell, The Strange Case(s) of Ira Arnstein, Serial Litigator, MUSIC REPORTS,
http://accounting.musicreports.com/smart_licensing/content_article.php?article_id=76
&title=The+Strange+Case(s)+of+Ira+Arnstein%2C+Serial+Litigator (last visited Nov.
12, 2010).
241
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469.
242
Id. at 468.
243
Id. at 472-73.
244
Id. at 473.
245
Id.
246
See id. at 468, 472-73. The majority did, however, rely on the landmark fair use
case of Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.), in
its analysis. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472 n.18.
239
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generally. Indeed, courts — even outside of copyright — came to see
Arnstein as forbidding summary judgment except in only the most
extraordinary circumstances, those where there was not even “the
slightest doubt as to the facts.”247 Several years later, the influence of
Arnstein’s summary judgment prohibition weakened: subsequent
courts rejected Arnstein’s prohibition to the extent that it precluded
even the usual standard that allows summary judgment where no
reasonable jury could find otherwise.248 Nevertheless, despite this
curtailment of Arnstein’s forceful prohibition of summary judgment,
Arnstein’s general proposition remains intact, i.e., that copyright raises
issues of fact peculiarly fitted to a jury.249
In the decade following Arnstein, there are no recorded opinions of
courts employing summary means to decide copyright cases that
involved fair use. Only two recorded cases arose where litigants moved
for summary judgment in actions involving fair use.250 In both cases,
the courts quickly dismissed the motion.251 Not until 1963252 did the
first decision arise in which a court granted a motion for summary
247
See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1967)
(relying on Arnstein for quoted proposition in copyright suit); Armco Steel Corp. v.
Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir. 1960) (relying on Arnstein for quoted
proposition in breach-of-contract suit); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (framing summary
judgment as turning on whether “there is the slightest doubt as to the facts”).
248
See Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing
copyright infringement suit) (“Arnstein, which held that a grant of summary judgment
is improper whenever there is the slightest doubt as to the facts, is no longer good
law.”); Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319 (2d Cir. 1975)
(discussing insurance settlement agreement dispute) (“Although for a period of time
this Circuit was reluctant to approve summary judgment in any but the most
extraordinary circumstances, see, e. g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir.
1946), that trend has long since been jettisoned in favor of an approach more in
keeping with the spirit of Rule 56 . . . .”).
249
See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999)
(granting summary judgment for defendants in copyright suit yet citing Arnstein for
proposition that “[s]ummary judgment historically has been withheld in copyright
cases because courts have been reluctant to make subjective determinations . . .”).
250
See Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Winwar v.
Time, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 629, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
251
See Thompson, 94 F. Supp. at 454 (relying on Arnstein to deny plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment on grounds that “the defendant may possibly have raised
triable issues by this defense of fair use”); Winwar, 83 F. Supp. at 629 (relying on
MacDonald v. DuMaurier and Arnstein for proposition that “the facts relating to the
alleged ‘fair use’ should be determined upon trial of these issues”).
252
Cf. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 199 F. Supp. 860, 861
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (concluding, on summary judgment, that plaintiff’s expression was
not copyrightable, and so disposing “of what would, on the issue of infringement, be
questions of fact, viz., whether the defendant’s use was ‘fair use’ ”).
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judgment that involved fair use: Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.253
There, the court’s description of the plaintiffs’ infringement arguments
suggests that the court viewed those arguments as entirely
unreasonable, which is consistent with the summary judgment
standard that judges may decide issues of fact if no reasonable jury
would find otherwise.254 The court, therefore, granted summary
judgment for the defendant on most of the plaintiffs’ claims.255
Notably, though, the court did find triable issues of fact where the use
of the work was not clearly fair.256
Thus, from the outset of the fair use doctrine in the mid-1700s to
the mid-1900s, fair use represented a triable issue of fact for a jury.257
In actions at law, courts routinely described and treated fair use as
raising an issue of fact for a jury rather than a pure issue of law for a
judge.258
B. Decades of Disarray: 1970s and 1980s
In 1968, the first recorded case arose where fair use was treated as a
pure issue of law: Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.259 There,
District Judge Wyatt ruled for the defendant on summary judgment.260
The plaintiff, Time Inc., held copyrights in the Zapruder film of
President Kennedy’s assassination; the defendant had copied frames
from the film to produce a book about the event.261 In ruling for the
defendant, Judge Wyatt did not find that a reasonable jury could only

253
Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 911, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff’d, 329
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). In Berlin, copyright holders of popular songs argued that the
publishers of Mad Magazine infringed their copyrights by publishing parodies of their
songs.
254
See id. at 913 (“It is obvious that defendants’ lyrics have little in common with
plaintiffs’ but meter and a few words, except in two instances which will be discussed
below. Defendants have created original, ingenious lyrics on subjects completely
dissimilar from those of plaintiffs’ songs.”).
255
See id. at 915.
256
See id.
257
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
258
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
259
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(finding fair use of plaintiff’s film frames of President Kennedy’s assassination).
260
Interestingly, the defendant did not move for summary judgment; the plaintiff
did; yet the court entered a judgment for the defendant. See id. at 131, 133, 146. That
this case was eligible for a jury as an action at law is evident from the fact that the
plaintiff sought damages and that a jury was requested. Id. at 132-33.
261
Id. at 131-32.
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find that the use was fair.262 To the contrary, he characterized fair use
as a “difficult issue,” describing the process of applying the fair use
factors to the circumstances at hand as a “difficult job.”263 He admitted
an “initial reluctance” to find fair use, but then ultimately held that
“the balance seems to be in favor of defendants.”264 On the issue of
market impact, he commented that rather than inferring harm, “[i]t
seems more reasonable to speculate” market enhancement for the
plaintiff’s work.265 Hence, Judge Wyatt’s language in his fair use
analysis demonstrated that he did not apply the usual summary
judgment standard that permits judicial ruling where a reasonable jury
could reach only one inference from the evidence.
Despite his difficulty in reaching a fair use conclusion, Judge Wyatt
defended his decision to treat fair use on summary judgment.266 A trial
was not necessary, he explained, because the facts were undisputed.267
He therefore considered the only factual issues to be those that
surrounded historical facts, those which were undisputed.268
Impliedly, Judge Wyatt considered the application-of-law-to-fact
issues as pure issues of law for a judge to decide.269 And so, in contrast
to all judges before him, Judge Wyatt decided fair use as a pure issue
of law.
Following Judge Wyatt, some courts during the 1970s and 1980s
treated fair use as a pure issue of law.270 Others granted summary
262

See id. at 144.
Id. at 144, 146.
264
Id. at 146.
265
Id.
266
See id. at 133.
267
Id. The court also relied on the fact that both the plaintiff and the defendant
agreed that summary judgment was proper. Id. This reason, which other courts have
employed to justify summary judgment of fair use, is faulty. See discussion infra Part
III.D.2.
268
See Time, 293 F. Supp. at 133.
269
See id.
270
For example, in Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1174-79 (9th Cir. 1983), the
Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s copyright
infringement claim and, in so doing, rejected the defendant’s argument that fair use
applied and entered judgment for the plaintiff on summary judgment. The defendant
had reproduced eleven pages of the plaintiff’s thirty-five-page recipe book for the
purpose of creating a booklet to be used in her cake-decorating classes. Id. at 1173. In
its six pages of fair use analysis, the Ninth Circuit never considered whether summary
judgment was appropriate to draw inferences — inferences on which the reasonable
mind of the district judge had disagreed. See id. at 1174-79.
In Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit expressly
adopted the view that the role of the jury is with respect to only the historical facts —
not the inferences to be drawn from those facts: “No material historical facts are at
263
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judgment under the usual standard that no reasonable jury would find
otherwise.271 Some did so with seeming reluctance, noting that
summary judgment was usually not appropriate for deciding fair
issue in this case. The parties dispute only the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from
the admitted facts. Because . . . these judgments are legal in nature, we can make them
without usurping the function of the jury.”
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1531-32 (C.D.
Cal. 1985), a district court considered whether analyzing the four factors was
appropriate on summary judgment. The court reasoned that because the parties did
not dispute the historical facts, the only disagreement arose over the conclusions that
should be drawn from those facts, so summary judgment was appropriate. Id. at 1532.
The Hustler district court thereby implicitly held the issues in the four-factor analysis
to be purely legal. The Ninth Circuit proceeded to affirm the district court’s holding.
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1149 (9th Cir.
1986); see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753-54, 757-58 (9th
Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment that denied fair use on grounds that
substantiality of copying outweighed parodic nature of use and reciting district court’s
view that issues for consideration on summary judgment were “purely legal”);
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(contemplating fair use on summary judgment stating “[a]s no dispute exists as to the
facts giving rise to this action, but only as to the legal consequences, the Court
believes this case to be appropriate for summary disposition”).
Other decisions suggest that courts treat fair use as a pure legal issue rather than
one of fact based solely on the substance of issue under consideration, where it
appears that reasonable minds could disagree over the outcome. See Supermarket of
Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408-09 (9th Cir.
1986) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for plaintiff, rejecting fair
use where defendant had employed plaintiff’s real estate listings in its advertising);
Schumann v. Albuquerque Corp., 664 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D.N.M. 1987) (granting
plaintiff summary judgment, denying fair use where defendants broadcasted news
information while copyrighted songs played in background of on-the-spot reporting);
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. v. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 219-20 (D. Kan.
1987) (granting plaintiff summary judgment, denying fair use where defendant used
plaintiff’s telephone directory to create another telephone directory), rev’d on other
grounds, 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1300-03 (D.D.C.
1985) (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment despite fair use argument
where defendant quoted excerpts of already-published diary entries of plaintiff); DC
Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 117-19 (N.D. Ga.
1984) (denying fair use on summary judgment where defendant employed references
to plaintiff’s copyrighted characters, Superman and Wonder Woman, in skits for
singing telegrams).
271
See, e.g., Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 324, 326 (D. Iowa 1977) (finding on summary judgment that fair use could not
apply and noting that evidence of fair use could lead to only one reasonable
interpretation). Of course, courts are not always clear on whether they are applying
the no-reasonable-jury standard of summary judgment, or alternatively, are treating
the issue as a pure matter of law. See, e.g., Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 940, 944
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (applying fair use to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment,
but failing to specify whether it did so as pure matter of law or under no-reasonablejury standard).
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use.272 Still others followed the traditional view expressed in Arnstein
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, fair use was inappropriate
for summary judgment.273
During this time period, it is worth noting the positions of the two
circuits where the majority of fair use issues arise, the Second and the
Ninth Circuits. In 1978, the Ninth Circuit appeared to have adopted
the view that the issue of fair use was legal for judges to decide.274 That
Circuit again appeared to have affirmed that position in 1983 and in
1986.275 By contrast, the Second Circuit in 1977 and again in 1982
intimated that summary judgment was especially ill suited for
deciding fair use.276 Then in 1986, the Second Circuit approved of
summary judgment for deciding fair use, and in so doing, expressly
recognized its departure from its own past precedent on this matter.277

272

In Steinberg, a district court granted a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
where the defendant argued fair use. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures, 663 F. Supp.
706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Recognizing the law’s preference for a jury to decide the
issue, the court in Steinberg explained that because both parties had expressly waived
their right to a jury and because none of the evidence required assessing witness
credibility, summary judgment was appropriate. Id. Under those circumstances,
summary judgment would be indistinguishable from a bench trial. See also Quinto v.
Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 563 (D.D.C. 1981) (granting summary
judgment for plaintiff and in so doing, noting that “[a]lthough courts are highly
reluctant to grant motions for summary judgment in copyright cases, this is an
exceptional case in which summary judgment is appropriate”).
273
See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“The four factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are
normally questions for the jury.”); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir.
1977) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants and
stating “[w]hether or not there has been substantial use which would deprive
appellees of the fair use defense is a decision which must be made by the trier of fact
after all the evidence has been introduced”); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (relying on Professor Melville Nimmer’s position that “the issue of
‘fair use’ presents questions of fact and thus should not be determined on a motion for
summary judgment”); NIMMER, supra note 190, at 600 (describing fair use as “triable
issue of fact” inappropriate for summary judgment).
274
See Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 753-54, 757-58.
275
See cases cited supra note 270. The Ninth Circuit did affirm a jury finding
denying fair use in 1984. See Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (9th
Cir. 1984).
276
See cases cited supra note 273.
277
See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1986).
Interestingly, in that 1986 case, the Second Circuit narrowed its holding to summary
judgments for defendants. Id. at 1258.
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C. Fair Use as a Matter of Law: 1990s and Beyond
By the 1990s, judges were becoming quite comfortable deciding fair
use on summary judgment.278 This trend has continued to the
present.279 Despite past warnings against this practice in the common
law, judges now treat the issue as entirely appropriate for summary
judgment, regardless of whether reasonable minds would disagree
over inferences in the fair use analysis.280 Only a few relics remain of
278
See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111-12 (2d Cir.
1998) (ruling for plaintiff on summary judgment, thereby reversing district court’s
grant of summary judgment for defendant, and commenting that one of factors in fair
use analysis — weighty factor of market impact — posed “a very close question,” but
that “[o]n balance,” that factor “tips” toward plaintiff on grounds that defendant failed
to demonstrate “an absence” of “potential” for market harm); L.A. News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting case law as
“rejecting argument that fair use is appropriate for determination by summary
judgment only when no reasonable jury could have decided the question differently,”
while affirming grant of summary judgment for copyright holder on issue of fair use);
Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that fair use decision is improper on motion for summary
judgment); see also Beebe, supra note 35, at 554 (noting “remarkable increase in the
prevalence of fair use summary judgment opinions that began in the mid-1990s and
has continued to the present”). At least two cases in 1991, however, reflected the prior
treatment of courts towards the issue of fair use: Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953
F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The fact-driven nature of the fair use determination
suggests that a district court should be cautious in granting Rule 56 motions in this
area . . . .”); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(denying motion for summary judgment of fair use issue on grounds that fair use
“requires a fact-intensive inquiry,” which made it “ill-suited for summary judgment”).
279
See cases cited infra note 280.
280
See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The parties dispute only
the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the admitted facts. Because, under Harper
& Row, these judgments are legal in nature, we can make them without usurping the
function of the jury.”); see, e.g., Thomas M. Gilbert Architects, P.C. v. Accent Builders
& Developers, LLC, No. 08-2103, 2010 WL 1804135, at *5 (4th Cir. May 6, 2010)
(upholding summary judgment for copyright holder where defendant had altered
architectural designs to construct building); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g,
512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing fair use on summary judgment despite
parties’ dispute over four factors and noting that “it is well established that a court can
resolve the issue of fair use on a motion for summary judgment”); Zomba Enters., Inc.
v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming summary
judgment for copyright holder on issue of fair use where defendant used copyrighted
songs in karaoke discs); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769,
773-74, 782 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for copyright holder where
defendant had installed more copies of plaintiff’s computer program onto its
computers than it had licenses for, despite evidence that number of computers
running program at any one time never exceeded number of licenses); BMG Music v.
Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 889-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment for
copyright holder where defendant had downloaded copyrighted music in order to
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the idea that the doctrine is unsuitable for summary consideration:
occasionally judges will recite a throwaway line in their opinion to the
effect that courts should be careful in deciding fair use on summary
judgment given its fact-intensive nature, only to engage in
controversial factfinding during their summary analysis of the four
factors.281 On summary judgment, judges treat the four-factor analysis
as raising pure legal issues, construing the historical facts as raising
the only factual matters in the fair use analysis.282
sample songs and determine whether she desired to buy them from retailer, despite
evidence that her use effected greater profits for plaintiff than plaintiff otherwise
would have made had she not committed use); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila.
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s
grant of summary judgment for defendant and, in so doing, foreclosing defendant
from arguing fair use to jury, concluding that “[o]n balance, the defense of fair use of
[the plaintiff’s work] fails” where defendant copied religious text of plaintiff, which
was no longer in print, and distributed copies to religious followers); Castle Rock
Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-46 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming
summary judgment for copyright holder where defendant created trivia book about
plaintiff’s copyrighted television show); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d
177, 181, 184-90 (D. Mass. 2007) (granting summary judgment for copyright holder
where defendant displayed in broadcast portion of photograph of police arrest, despite
evidence suggesting that use “was for news reporting” purposes, that “the
photographs [were] factual works,” that plaintiff exercised “minimal authorial
decision-making to make [the] work,” and that defendant “did edit the photo in a way
that was arguably more than superficial”); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh,
433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238-42 (D. Colo. 2006) (granting summary judgment for
copyright holder where defendant copied movies to edit out morally offensive content
and then required consumer to purchase both authorized and edited copies of movie);
see also cases cited supra note 278.
281
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The fact that
the test envisioned by the [Copyright] Act is dependent on the circumstances of each
case might suggest summary judgment is unavailable when fair use is the issue, but
such relief may be granted when appropriate.”); Television Digest, 841 F. Supp. at 9
(same); Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 88-95
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (deciding fair use issue on summary judgment despite its recognition
that “[c]ourts ‘should be especially wary of granting summary judgment’ in cases
involving copyright infringement, because they often are highly fact-dependent”);
Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that fair use “is ordinarily a factual question for the jury to determine” and
then justifying its summary judgment analysis on grounds that facts existed whereby
it could engage in four-factor analysis), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
282
E.g., Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (rejecting defendant’s fair use argument
on summary judgment and, in so doing, noting that as to “material historical facts . . .
the parties are in substantial agreement” and that “the parties’ disagreements are over
the interpretation of facts,” which “are questions of law” appropriate for summary
judgment analysis); Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 677 (D. Minn.
1995) (“[W]hen parties do not dispute the relevant historical facts underlying each of
the [fair use] factors, courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment on the
basis of the fair use defense”); L.A. Time v. Free Republic, No. CV98-7840-

534

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 44:483

An example of a case that typifies this judicial treatment of fair use
on summary judgment is the 1997 case of Castle Rock Entertainment,
Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.283 There, the defendant had used
expressions from the popular television show, Seinfeld, in which the
plaintiff held a copyright, to create a trivia book about the show.284 On
the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the district judge, nowSupreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, rejected the defendant’s fair
use argument.285 She began her analysis by reciting a line of case law
stating that fair use is ordinarily a jury question, but then justified her
treatment of fair use on summary judgment on the grounds that
because the historical facts allowed her to evaluate the statutory
factors, she could determine the issue as a matter of law.286 She then
noted the difficulty that the competing inferences presented,
suggesting the reasonableness of those competing inferences.287 After
discussing reasons for and against finding fair use in the first factor of
transformation and the third factor of amount and substantiality, thenJudge Sotomayor paused to admit that although those factors tipped in
favor of the plaintiff, she found the plaintiff’s position “hardly
compelling.”288 On the fourth factor — market impact — Judge
Sotomayor recognized that the plaintiff’s behavior suggested drawing
an inference towards fairness: she noted that the plaintiff’s alleged
plans to create a book like defendant’s amounted to nothing more than
“a remote possibility” and that the book may have actually increased
demand for the show;289 she expressly inferred that the book did not
MMM(AJWx), 1999 WL 33644483, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999) (“Fair use is a
mixed question of law and fact. It is nonetheless appropriate to resolve the issue at the
summary judgment stage where the historical facts are undisputed and the only
question is the proper legal conclusion to be drawn from those facts.”).
283
Castle Rock Entm’t, 955 F. Supp. at 261-62.
284
Id.
285
Id. at 272.
286
Id. at 267.
287
See id. at 272 (“[T]here are numerous competing considerations which make
this decision a difficult one . . . .”). Compare id. at 268 (describing transformative
inquiry as “central purpose” of first factor, declaring defendant’s use to be
transformative, and stating that “[i]t may even be said that defendants have identified
a rather creative and original way in which to capitalize upon the development of a
‘T.V. culture’ in our society”), with id. at 272 (opining that first factor favors plaintiff
only by giving meaning of transformation “a generous understanding”). Compare id. at
269 (noting that defendants used less than four percent of expression from any one
television episode), with id. at 269-70 (reasoning that amount used was substantial on
grounds that wherever defendant’s use is sufficiently similar to infer copying,
defendant will have always taken substantial portion of plaintiff’s work).
288
Id. at 270.
289
Id. at 271 (“[T]hough plaintiff proclaims plans to enter derivative markets with
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substitute for, but rather complemented, the show.290 Nevertheless,
despite these contrary inferences, Judge Sotomayor inferred that the
fourth factor favored the plaintiff, and thereby ultimately concluded
that “on balance” the use was not fair.291 In no uncertain terms, Judge
Sotomayor treated the inferences to be drawn in the fair use analysis as
close calls. She openly admitted that the “numerous competing
considerations” made her “decision a difficult one.”292 And close calls
can be decided on summary judgment only if they arise as pure issues
of law, not fact.293 Thus, Judge Sotomayor treated the inferences in the
four-factor analysis as legal rather than factual.
Noteworthy is the fact that in affirming her opinion, the Second
Circuit also appears to have treated those inferences as legal.294 Their
analysis did not defer to any of Judge Sotomayor’s conclusions of
unfairness.295 Rather, the appellate court merely performed its own
independent review, implying that fair use was a pure issue of law.296
D. Reasons for the Present Treatment
The difference in past and present treatment of fair use on summary
judgment could not be more blatant. Yesterday, fair use was an issue
of fact especially suited for juries; today, fair use is a pure issue of law
especially suited for judges.297 This blatant distinction in treatment
raises the question of why judges have taken the issue away from
juries. Several reasons might exist. The most obvious is that judges are
following a now-widespread practice.298 More subtle, but just as
controlling, are three other reasons. This section contemplates these
books about Seinfeld, there is little suggestion — and certainly not enough to remove
all material doubt — that such projects are anything more than a remote
possibility. . . . [I]f past practice provides any indication, plaintiff will be slow to
develop any such works [like defendant’s book].”).
290
Id. (“The Court agrees; [the book] compliments Seinfeld. The book is only of
value to a regular viewer of the program.”).
291
Id. at 272.
292
Id. (“Though there are numerous competing considerations which make this
decision a difficult one, the Court is persuaded that, on balance, [the defendant’s trivia
book] does not represent a fair use of Seinfeld.”).
293
See 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 38, § 2725, at 410-12.
294
See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-46
(2d Cir. 1998).
295
See id.
296
See id.
297
See discussion supra Part I.A–C.
298
For a list of cases establishing precedent for deciding fair use on summary
judgment, see supra notes 278, 280.
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three reasons: (1) a simple misinterpretation of precedent; (2) faulty
judicial reasoning; and (3) judicial distrust of juries.
1.

A Misinterpreted Sentence

Of particular importance to cases that treat fair use as a pure issue of
law is one sentence in the 1985 Supreme Court decision, Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.299 Judges in the 1990s seized
upon one sentence from this case to justify their summary treatment
of fair use.300 The sentence states: “Where the district court has found
facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate
court need not remand for further factfinding but may conclude as a
matter of law that the challenged use does not qualify as a fair use of
the copyrighted work.”301 Taking this sentence out of context, judges
interpreted it to mean that the issues arising in the evaluation of the
statutory factors constitute issues of law.302 As issues of law, these
issues could be decided on summary judgment, so reasoned district
299
See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
Although not expressly noted in fair use cases, the Supreme Court trilogy of summary
judgment decisions in 1986 may also have played a role in the increased rate of
summary judgment decisions during the 1990s. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 576 (1986).
300
See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.
2003) (relying on portion of reasoning from Harper & Row); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d
432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs.,
Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (same), aff’d, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993)
(same); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (M.D. Tenn.
1991) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 972 F.3d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S.
569 (1994).
301
See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560.
302
An example of this interpretation occurs in Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.3d at 436.
There, the plaintiff argued that the jury should decide the issue of fair use. Rejecting
this argument, the Ninth Circuit quoted the sentence from Harper to declare that the
Supreme Court had “completely undercut” the plaintiff’s argument. Id. The court then
opined that under Harper, conclusions in the fair use analysis that must be drawn
from admitted facts constituted judgments that were “legal in nature” so, therefore,
where “no material historical facts are at issue,” a judge can determine these
conclusions “without usurping the function of the jury.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has
since interpreted its Fisher v. Dees decision as “rejecting [the] argument that fair use is
appropriate for determination by summary judgment only when no reasonable jury
could have decided the question differently.” L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television
Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998). But see Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d
512, 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,
which means that it may be resolved on summary judgment if a reasonable trier of fact
could reach only one conclusion — but not otherwise.”).
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court judges. Thus, where historical facts were undisputed, judges
interpreted the cited sentence from Harper & Row as allowing them —
rather than the jury — to perform an evaluation of the statutory
factors.303 This interpretation has today become common.304
This interpretation is incorrect. The context of Harper & Row
demonstrates an entirely different meaning. At the district court level,
the parties waived their right to a jury by electing a bench trial.305 At
the conclusion of that trial, the court denied the defendant’s fair use
argument, but in its opinion, the court provided only minimal fair use
analysis.306 Specifically, the district court failed to draw inferences on
several factual issues that are material in the analysis: namely, whether
the defendant’s use was transformative; whether the nature of the
copyrighted work merited more or less protection as a creative or
factual work; and whether the amount of the work that the defendant
had used suggested fairness.307 The few inferences that the district
court did draw lacked substantive analysis.308
In such a situation as occurred in the district court’s bench-trial
opinion of Harper & Row — a failure to articulate factual inferences
material to the court’s judgment — an appellate court would normally
vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to articulate
those factual inferences.309 This rule the Supreme Court had recited
just a few years prior to Harper & Row, stating: “Where the trial court
fails to make findings, or to find on a material issue, and an appeal is
taken, the appellate court will normally vacate the judgment and
303

See cases cited supra note 300.
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 12.10[B][4], at 12-190 (contrasting
older view of factual nature of fair use inquiry with modern view where inferences
may be determined as matter of law).
305
See Harper, 471 U.S. at 543.
306
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The extent of the district court’s fair use analysis consisted of the
following three sentences:
304

Assessing the “fair use” factors, I conclude here, too, that none of them
provide The Nation with the absolution it seeks. First, the article was
published for profit. Second, the infringed work was soon-to-be published.
Third, The Nation took what was essentially the heart of the book, and
fourth, the effect of The Nation’s extensive use of the Nixon pardon material
caused the Time agreement to be aborted and thus diminished the value of
the copyright.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
307
See id.
308
See id.
309
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 n.22 (1982).
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remand the action for appropriate findings to be made.”310 Under
normal procedure, then, the appellate court in Harper & Row should
have vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court to
articulate its factual inferences that constituted material facts in the
bench-trial judgment. But normal procedure does not apply to an
appeal of a fair use trial.311 In fair use, if the historical facts are such
that an appellate court may draw factual inferences that support the
ultimate finding of the factfinder (be it jury or judge), the appellate
court may simply affirm the judgment as a matter of law, without
remanding for further factfinding as to the inferences that the district
court failed to articulate.312 Stated another way: “Where the district
court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory
factors, an appellate court need not remand for further factfinding but
may conclude as a matter of law that the challenged use does not
qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work.”313
Thus, the misinterpreted sentence in Harper & Row merely points
out that the usual appellate procedure of vacating and remanding a
judgment where a district court failed to articulate its material factual
inferences does not apply in fair use.314 If the district court has found
historical facts sufficient to evaluate the statutory factors, and if it is
possible to draw factual inferences in that evaluation which support
the district court’s ultimate decision (i.e., a denial of fair use), then the
appellate court may affirm that decision as a matter of law.315 Even if
the district court never expressly stated its factual inferences that
supported its bench-trial decision, the appellate court can affirm the
district court’s decision without remanding for factual findings as to
those specific inferences.316
It therefore appears evident that the quoted sentence from Harper &
Row does not mean that the inferences in the four-factor analysis are
legal. Nevertheless, because this mistaken interpretation has become
so prevalent among judges as a basis to justify analyzing fair use issues
on summary judgment — even where those issues present close calls
— additional comment should be made to dispel any doubt that the
mistaken interpretation is indeed mistaken. To this end, two specific
portions of the quoted sentence merit further explication. The first is:
310
311
312
313
314
315
316

Id.
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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“Where the district court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of
the statutory factors, an appellate court need not remand for further
factfinding.”317 Here the words “need not” and “further factfinding”
are instructive. They suggest that an appellate court could remand for
the district court to conduct further factfinding on the statutory
factors, although the appellate court need not do so. Moreover, the
quoted portion implies that the evaluation of the statutory factors
must entail factfinding — and not merely factfinding that makes the
evaluation possible, i.e., the historical facts — but further factfinding.
An implication of the quoted sentence, then, is that an evaluation of
the statutory factors produces further factfinding.
The second noteworthy portion is: “conclude as a matter of law.”318
This phrase denotes a process of drawing a legal conclusion. That
process cannot correspond to the evaluation of the statutory factors,
for that evaluation involves “further factfinding.” It must instead
correspond to the process of evaluating whether the district court’s
decision is sustainable. More specifically, the phrase “conclude as a
matter of law” refers to the process by which an appellate court
concludes that the inferences that a district court may have drawn
during a bench trial are reasonable. “[C]onclude as a matter of law”
allows appellate courts to assess whether the district court’s inferences
that it drew in the four-factor analysis are reasonable, and nothing
more than that.
Thus, the quoted sentence in Harper & Row does not support the
current judicial trend of evaluating fair use arguments on summary
judgment. Contrary to widespread interpretation, the sentence does
not mean that an evaluation of the fair use factors raises purely legal
issues. The sentence implies just the opposite — that the evaluation
raises factual issues. The sentence does not promote, and indeed it
preaches against, judicial treatment of fair use issues on summary
judgment.
2.

Faulty Reasoning

In addition to the misinterpreted sentence from Harper & Row
discussed above, judges have also employed mistaken reasoning to
justify summary judgment of fair use. Judges have reasoned that if
parties do not submit conflicting evidence, the conclusions to be
drawn from that evidence must be legal.319 That reasoning is flawed
317
318
319

See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 88
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because the interpretation of undisputed evidence often constitutes an
issue of fact: that evidence is undisputed does not imply that its
interpretation is undisputed, thus giving rise to a burden of persuasion
in the general burden to prove a fact.320 Consider other areas of law: in
tort, whether undisputed statements constitute defamatory remarks is
a factual issue;321 in contract, whether undisputed conduct constitutes
a material breach is a factual issue;322 in property, whether undisputed
land conditions constitute a nuisance is a factual issue.323 In the
context of fair use, then, judges are mistaken to believe that only
issues that admit conflicting evidence may be considered factual
issues. That historical facts are undisputed does not imply that the
interpretation of those facts raises legal issues.324
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (justifying summary judgment decision of fair use on grounds that
“the likelihood that additional, non-cumulative evidence will be presented at trial is
slight”); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (labeling historical facts as material facts, and concluding that although parties
disputed conclusion to be drawn from those facts, no dispute existed as to any
material facts — especially given unlikelihood that parties would produce any
additional evidence at trial); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F.
Supp. 1526, 1532 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (justifying summary disposal of fair use issue on
ground that “the basic, historical facts upon which the fair use issue depends are
undisputed; the only disagreement is over what conclusion should be drawn”), aff’d,
796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
320
See generally 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 563 (Kenneth S. Broun ed.,
6th ed. 2006) (explaining factual burden of persuasion as burden to interpret
evidence).
321
See Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 746 n.12 (1983)
(commenting on defendant’s right to jury on “the proper factual inferences to be
drawn from undisputed facts” in libel suit); Rubin v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc.,
271 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f an allegedly defamatory publication is
reasonably susceptible of two meanings, one of which is defamatory and one of which
is not, it is for the trier of fact to determine the meaning understood by the average
reader.”).
322
See DiPietro v. Sipex Corp., 865 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (“A
breach of contract is material when the breach is of an essential and inducing feature
of the contract . . . . Whether a material breach has occurred is a question of fact
ordinarily to be decided by a jury.”) (citations omitted).
323
See Jackson v. City of Blue Springs, 904 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(“[T]he issue as to whether the condition of their land constituted a nuisance becomes
a question of fact for the jury.”).
324
See Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873). In
Sioux City, the plaintiff sued the defendant railroad company on behalf of a six-yearold who had sustained injuries on a turntable belonging to the defendant. Although
the underlying facts were undisputed, the trial judge submitted to the jury the issue of
whether the defendant acted negligently. Id. at 657-58. The defendant argued that the
issue should not have gone to the jury because the underlying facts were undisputed,
so the issue must have been legal for the judge. Id. at 659. The Court rejected this
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Judges have also reasoned that where both litigants move for
summary judgment, summary judgment must be appropriate.325 That
is simply not true.326 Even if both litigants move for summary
judgment, this fact does not imply that either litigant has waived his
right to a jury trial in the event that he loses the motion. In moving for
summary judgment, a litigant waives his right to a jury trial on the
condition that he win the motion.327 So although both litigants waive
their respective rights to a jury trial where both litigants have moved
for summary judgment, both their waivers are conditional on winning
the motion. The prevailing litigant’s motion for summary judgment
cannot effect a waiver of the losing party’s right to a jury trial. Judges,
then, may not infer that both parties have unconditionally waived
argument:
Upon the facts proven in such cases, it is a matter of judgment and
discretion, of sound inference, what is the deduction to be drawn from the
undisputed facts. Certain facts we may suppose to be clearly established
from which one sensible, impartial man would infer that proper care had not
been used, and that negligence existed; another man equally sensible and
equally impartial would infer that proper care had been used, and that there
was no negligence. It is this class of cases and those akin to it that the law
commits to the decision of a jury.
Id. at 663-64.
325
E.g., Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 88
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing fact that “each party ‘has contended that its case is complete’
by moving for summary judgment” as reason to decide fair use on summary
judgment); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (“[O]ne critical fact distinguishes this case from most copyright infringement
actions, in which it is preferable to leave the determination of the issue to a jury: each
party has contended that its case is complete by moving for summary judgment.”);
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1532 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (justifying summary disposal of fair use issue on ground that “[b]oth parties
have moved the court for summary judgment”); see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v.
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (reciting district court’s decision to
decide fair use on summary judgment based on fact that “both parties moved for
summary judgment, [and] they stipulated that the case be tried on a record consisting
of their summary judgment submissions and other stipulated and submitted facts”).
326
See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“While both parties urge this court to resolve the issue of fair use [on summary
judgment], the record before us is insufficient to determine fair use as a matter of
law.”).
327
Rule 56 precludes a court from entering a summary judgment if there exists a
material issue of fact. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). By moving for summary judgment, a
litigant is representing that no material fact exists that would preclude the court from
ruling for him. The litigant is not representing that no material fact exists that would
preclude the court from ruling for the opposing party. Thus, the litigant’s motion for
summary judgment is conditional upon winning the motion.
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their jury right where both parties have moved for summary
judgment. Both parties moving for summary judgment is different
from both parties agreeing to a bench trial.
3.

Judicial Distrust of Juries

Another possible reason that judges have taken the fair use issue
away from juries is that judges simply distrust the jury. One case
illustrates this possibility. In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, Judge
Nancy Gertner denied the defendants’ motion for a jury trial on their
fair use defense, dismissing the defense on summary judgment.
One sentence from her opinion is revealing: “[Defendants’] demand
for a jury determination on this issue appears all but standardless; ‘fair
use’ would, in effect, be any use whatsoever that a jury deemed fair.”328
Judge Gertner was wrong. Fair use is indeed any use that a jury
deems to be fair.329 Although the judge may provide instruction and
guidance, ultimately the jury’s view of fairness carries the day.330 The
jury draws and weighs the inferences that determine whether a use is
fair.331 But Judge Gertner could not accept this possibility. She denied
defendants a jury because if the jury were to find the use to be fair,
this would constitute a standardless finding, or in other words, a
finding that was based on incorrect inferences.332 The jury could have
reached a finding that was contrary to the finding that she believed to
be correct, and that possibility she could not allow.333 Simply put, she

328
See Electronic Order on Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Capital Records,
Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. July 27, 2009) [hereinafter Gertner
Order].
329
E.g., N.Y. Univ. v. Planet Earth Found., 163 Fed. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“As to the copyright infringement claim, the evidence also supports the jury’s finding
of fair use, under the four-factored analysis prescribed by statute. While [plaintiff]
vehemently argues, for instance, that [defendant]’s display of copyrighted material at a
fund-raiser was of a commercial nature, this issue is the jury’s to decide.”); see also
PATRY, COPYRIGHT, supra note 116, § 10:60 (“The trier of fact hears all evidence,
makes factual determinations about the credibility and weight to be given to that
evidence, weighs all four factors in light of those factual findings, and comes up with a
judgment based on applying the law to the facts found.”).
330
See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
331
See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
332
Tellingly, Judge Gertner’s quoted statement implies that she did not deny a jury
on the grounds that any reasonable jury would find the use to be infringing; nor on
the grounds that these issues were pure issues of law; rather, she denied a jury on the
grounds that a jury could find a use to be fair. See Gertner Order, supra note 328, at 1.
333
See id.
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did not trust the jury to decide the case the way that she believed it
should have been decided.334
Such distrust of the jury may arise as a general matter or in the
specific context of fair use. As a general matter, juries tax a court’s
schedule and resources. Jury trials are lengthy and expensive for all
involved, so it is possible that in some instances, judges view juries as
not worth their cost.335 Juries also represent a significant concession of
power for a judge.336 Once a jury enters the courtroom, the judge has
ceded a substantial amount of control in determining the case’s
outcome. It is possible that some judges would prefer to retain that
control.
In the context of fair use, it is possible that judges distrust juries
because they believe that juries might subscribe to incorrect social
norms relevant to copyright infringement. It is possible that a judge
may perceive popular opinion as spurning copyright protection,
especially with the advent of the Internet.337 From this perspective, it
334
This quoted statement is not the first instance where Judge Gertner has
demonstrated her distrust of the jury in the fair use context. In an earlier court filing
of the same case, Judge Gertner “found cause to consider who is the proper
decisionmaker on questions of fair use — the judge or a jury.” Order at 1, Capital
Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. July 14, 2009). In that filing,
she hinted that she believed fair use is a question “more appropriately decided by a
judge than a jury.” Id. at 4 n.1. In another case, Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F.
Supp. 2d 177, 181, 184-90 (D. Mass. 2007), Judge Gertner granted summary
judgment for a plaintiff copyright holder where the defendant had displayed in a
television news broadcast a portion of a photograph of a police arrest. Despite her
recognition that the use “was for news reporting” purposes, that “the photographs
[were] factual works,” that the plaintiff exercised “minimal authorial decision-making
to make [the] work,” and that the defendant “did edit the photo in a way that was
arguably more than superficial,” Judge Gertner found that the “balance” of the factors
favored the plaintiff, awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff, denying defendants
a jury. Id.
335
See Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets
Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658 (2010) (noting timeconsuming, expensive nature of jury trial amidst system of limited resources).
336
See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective,
48 DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 208-09 (1998) (observing power struggle between judge and
jury in context of tort law).
337
That judges perceive a change in social norms toward copyright infringement,
as a result of the Internet, is evident in case law. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding peer-to-peer
downloading to be infringing and noting that by end of year, there may be seventy-five
million peer-to-peer users), rev’d on other grounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
Scholars also are alluding to this perception of changing norm. See, e.g., Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 41
(2000) (observing popular norm that number of peer-to-peer file-sharers makes
conduct permissible and further observing that courts are momentarily holding with
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may be unwise to place fair use issues with ordinary members of
society, who are themselves subject to the pervasive influence of
Internet norms, because fair use calls for discretionary judgment. A
judge may believe that the changing norms toward copyright would
introduce too much wiggle room into fair use, if fair use ever reached
the jury room.
These reasons for distrusting the jury are of course only
possibilities. Whether they actually influence a judge cannot be
known, especially because that influence may be so subtle that it may
seem entirely irrelevant to a judge, even while coloring her perception
of the subjectivity-laden issues. Yet regardless of whether these
reasons actually do influence the judge, the reasons are an insufficient
basis for withholding fair use issues from a jury. Distrust of a jury, if it
occurs for any of the cited reasons, threatens the integrity of the
judicial system.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS
The present practice of treating fair use as a pure matter of law for a
judge to decide raises constitutional concern on two fronts.338 It denies
litigants’ constitutional right to a jury, and it threatens fair users’
constitutional right of free speech.
A. Right to a Jury
The Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved . . . .”339 Although as a general matter
summary judgment deprives a litigant of a jury, the Supreme Court
has articulated that summary judgment is constitutional because it
merely examines whether an issue exists for a jury to decide.340 But
traditional norms of copyright, rejecting new popular norm).
338
See generally Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 135-36 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure. . . . A little water, trickling here and there through a dam, is a small matter
in itself; but it may be a sinister menace to the security of the dam, which those living
in the valley below will do well to heed.”).
339
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
340
See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1972) (relying on
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902), for proposition
that “summary judgment does not violate the Seventh Amendment”); Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1902) (upholding summary
judgment process on grounds that it merely “prescribes the means of making an issue”
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Seventh Amendment concerns arise when courts do not follow the
rules of summary judgment — namely, when courts declare that no
issues exist for a jury to determine when in fact such issues do exist.341
More specifically, because the inferences in the four-factor analysis
constitute genuine issues of material fact rather than pure issues of
law, drawing those inferences on summary judgment raises
constitutional concern.342
1.

Fair Use Under Feltner

In 1998, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for an eight-member
majority (with a concurrence by Justice Scalia) in which the Court
found that courts were violating the Seventh Amendment in
determining damages awards in copyright cases.343 That case, Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., is instructive in the similar copyright
context of fair use. In Feltner, the plaintiff, Columbia Pictures, owned
the copyright to television shows that the defendant, Feltner,
broadcasted on its television station.344 At summary judgment,
Columbia prevailed as to liability,345 and so Feltner moved for a jury
trial on the issue of statutory damages.346 The district court denied
Feltner’s jury demand, awarding statutory damages after a bench
trial.347 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Feltner argued that the
denial violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury.
In considering Feltner’s argument, the Supreme Court recited the
general guidelines for determining whether a Seventh Amendment

for jury to determine). But see Thomas, supra note 123, at 139 (arguing that summary
judgment is unconstitutional).
341
See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1074-1132 (2003) (acknowledging
constitutional problems on summary judgment that arise in certain circumstances and
declaring that “if no ‘genuine issue of material fact’ exists and the movant is entitled to
judgment ‘as a matter of law,’ pretrial disposition does not raise questions of
constitutional dimensions”).
342
See generally 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1762, at
633 (1833) (describing right to jury as “privilege scarcely inferior to that in criminal
cases, which is conceded by all to be essential to political and civil liberty”).
343
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 523 U.S. 340, 342, 353, 355
(1998). Interestingly, now-Chief Justice John Roberts represented the prevailing
petitioner, Feltner, before the Supreme Court. Id. at 341.
344
Id. at 342-43.
345
Fair use was not an issue in any part of the case. See id.
346
Id. at 343.
347
Id. at 344.
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violation exists.348 In short, a violation exists where a court denies a
jury demand as to issues that determine legal rights recognized by the
common law when the Seventh Amendment was framed.349 The
disputed rights need not trace their history back to 1791, but they
must at least be akin to legal rights that existed during that period.350
The Feltner Court ultimately concluded that the Seventh
Amendment required a jury trial on the issue of statutory damages.351
In reaching that conclusion, the Court held that during the relevant
time period, copyright holders would pursue their legal rights through
actions at law.352 The Court pointed out that in pursuing the specific
right to damages, copyright holders would try the issue of damages to
a jury.353 This history compelled the Court to pronounce that
copyright holders today must also try the issue of statutory damages to
a jury — this despite language in the Copyright Act placing the issue
with the court.354
Feltner’s holding as to statutory damages in copyright actions
strongly suggests that the Seventh Amendment also requires jury
consideration of the fair use issue. Like the issue of statutory damages,
fair use represents an issue that determines whether copyright holders
may exercise their legal rights.355 But unlike the issue of statutory
damages, fair use is more fundamental to the legal right of
copyright.356 That is, the issue of statutory damages arises only after
the scope of a copyright holder’s right has been determined, or in
348

Id. at 347-48.
Id.; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 708-09 (1999).
350
Monterey, 526 U.S. at 708-09; Feltner, 523 U.S. at 348.
351
Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355.
352
See id. at 348-54.
353
See id.
354
See id. at 345, 355.
355
Justice Story explained the role of fair use in determining the legal rights of the
copyright holder as follows:
349

The true question in all cases of this sort [fair use cases] is (it has been said)
whether there has been a legitimate use of the copyright publication in the
fair exercise of a mental operation, deserving the character of a new work. If
there has been, although it may be prejudicial to the original author, it is not
an invasion of his legal rights.
2 STORY, supra note 206, § 939, at 242.
356
During the relevant time period, courts viewed fair use as a doctrine that
defined the scope of rights held by a copyright holder. See Ned Snow, The Forgotten
Right of Fair Use (Aug. 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1659855.
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other words, only after a defendant’s liability has been determined. By
contrast, the issue of fair use arises during the very process of
determining the scope of a copyright holder’s right, or in other words,
it is the very basis for determining liability.357 Therefore, if the
Supreme Court views the issue of statutory damages as subject to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, then certainly the Supreme
Court must view the issue of fair use likewise, for the latter issue is
more fundamental to the exercise of a copyright holder’s legal rights.
Like the history of statutory damages in copyright law, the history of
the common law in copyright actions well establishes that during the
relevant time period, courts recognized fair use as an issue that
determines legal rights. Part III.A above has set forth this history. To
recap, as early as 1769, in the famous case of Millar v. Taylor, English
common law began teaching that the jury shall consider circumstances
that would justify copying in order to determine whether a plaintiff
may prevail on an infringement claim.358 In 1785, the Chief Justice of
the King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield, presided over an action at law for
copyright infringement, and in doing so, he explained that in deciding
whether infringement had occurred, the jury would weigh those
principles that today underlie the doctrine of fair use.359 In 1803, Chief
Justice Lord Ellenborough also presided over an action at law for
copyright infringement, and he described the role of the jury as
deciding whether the defendant’s copying “was fairly done” so as to
admit no liability.360 Thus, at the time of the Seventh Amendment, fair
use existed as a jury issue that determined the legal rights of copyright
holders.361
Despite this history, a mistaken view of fair use has arisen that fair
use is a creature of equity and, therefore, not a legal right that existed
at common law.362 This view stems from the fact that other early
357
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)
(Story, J.) (explaining doctrine of fair use as circumstances that determine whether
infringement lies).
358
See Miller v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 224.
359
See Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.(b) (K.B.) 140 (“In all these
cases the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable
or not? . . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or not.”).
360
Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680.
361
See PATRY, FAIR USE PRIVILEGE, supra note 192, at 3-26.
362
Compare Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (treating fair use as
“equitable doctrine”), Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The fair use
doctrine was initially developed by courts as an equitable defense to copyright
infringement.”), and Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (describing fair use as “entirely equitable” doctrine), with PATRY,
COPYRIGHT, supra note 116 § 10:3 (“Fair use is not an equitable doctrine or an
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judges who articulated the doctrine of fair use sat in courts of equity
as opposed to courts of law.363 The incorrectness of this view is evident
from the well-established maxim of equitas sequitur legem (i.e., equity
follows the law):364 courts of equity must construe legal rights to
determine whether equity will furnish relief.365 A good example of this
principle is found in the first American case to articulate the doctrine
of fair use, Folsom v. Marsh, where Justice Story sat in a court of equity
and granted the plaintiff’s plea for an injunction against the defendants
from using the plaintiff’s expression.366 It was necessary for Justice
Story to construe the scope of the legal right of copyright to decide
whether to grant the equitable relief desired.367 For that purpose,
Justice Story articulated the limits of copyright, and that articulation
has become the current doctrine of fair use.368 Noteworthy is that
Justice Story did not describe these limits as a doctrine independent of
or distinct from the right of copyright.369 Indeed, he did not even
employ any terminology to describe these limits, not even the label of
“fair use.”370 For Justice Story, considerations of fair use were part and
parcel with the definition of the legal right of copyright.371 Indeed, in

equitable defense. As history reveals, it is a legal defense which may, and frequently is,
decided by a jury.”), and Leval, supra note 24, at 1127 (arguing that historically, fair
use is not creature of equity).
363
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 58 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136)
(considering fair use question in equitable proceeding); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (same). Further confusion
has arisen by the Supreme Court labeling fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” —
lifting this description from a House Committee Report — in order to emphasize that
the fair use analysis requires a “sensitive balancing of interests.” See Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-50 & n.31, 454-55 & n.40 (1984)
(emphasis added). The Court never suggested, however, that this label implied that the
doctrine arose as an equitable doctrine. See id. To the contrary, the Court expressly
pronounced that fair use represented a “common-law doctrine,” one that Congress
intended to codify when it legislated the doctrine into the Copyright Act. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
364
See Hedges v. Dixon Cnty., 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (“The established rule . . .
is that equity follows the law.”).
365
See Saunders v. Smith, (1838) 40 Eng. Rep. 1100, 1107 (Lord Chancellor
Cottenham) (“In all cases of injunctions in aid of legal rights — whether it be
copyright, patent right, or some other description of legal right which comes before
the Court [of Equity] — the office of the Court is consequent upon the legal right.”).
366
See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344-45, 348-49.
367
See id.
368
See id.
369
See id.
370
See id.
371
See id.; Snow, supra note 356.
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his commentaries on equity, Justice Story explained: “If there has been
[a legitimate use of the copyright], although it may be prejudicial to
the original author, it is not an invasion of his legal rights.”372 Justice
Story’s articulation of fair use principles in an equitable proceeding did
not transform the fair use doctrine into a creature of equity any more
than his articulation of copyright transformed the right of copyright
into a creature of equity. Ultimately, fair use did not arise as an
equitable doctrine.373
Thus, principles of fair use determined legal rights at common law
in 1791. As a result, issues of fair use fell to the jury. The Seventh
Amendment requires that they fall to the jury today.
2.

Problems of Denying a Jury

In 1791, there was good reason for mandating a civil jury. The right
to a jury was already well established at that time,374 and the Founders
considered it “essential in every free country.”375 The jury right reflects
the view that society trusts several citizens to decide a matter
admitting discretionary judgment more than society trusts a single
aristocratic judge.376 For like any other position of power, the office of
judge exposes its officer to subtle but weighty influences that may
affect impartiality.377 Influences attend the position of judge that are
less likely to attend the position of juror. The right to a jury guards
against those influences. Influences on judges that the Seventh
Amendment was intended to guard against apply as much in fair use
372

2 STORY, supra note 206, § 939, at 242 (emphasis added).
See PATRY, FAIR USE PRIVILEGE, supra note 192, at 5 (“It is therefore incorrect to
characterize fair use as a child of equity.”).
374
See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 212 (1999) (“By
the time of Magna Carta the inquest in civil cases was becoming fairly well established
as the trial jury, although not in criminal cases.”).
375
Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV) (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 354, 354 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Federal Farmer]; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine
(July 11, 1789), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 69, 71 (Henry A.
Washington ed., 1853) (“I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution.”).
376
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 375, at 363, 364 [hereinafter Jefferson Letter]
(observing that jury system “is the only way to ensure a long-continued and honest
administration of its powers”).
377
See id.; STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL
OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS 119-20 (2009) (explaining immoral behavior that
results from position of government power).
373
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today as they did in 1791. Two of these influences, improper devotion
and personal bias, are discussed below.
a.

Influence of Improper Devotion

Thomas Jefferson advocated the right to a jury because judges might
otherwise pay improper devotion to separate branches of
government.378 Certainly neither the executive nor the legislative
branches may adjudicate a specific legal dispute between two private
litigants, and so in specific disputes, neither branch should influence a
judge’s decision.379 For this reason, a devotion to either branch
threatens judicial impartiality. This devotion becomes especially
dangerous where the issue raises a constitutional question. Because
the judiciary (through judge or jury)380 has exclusive authority, and
indeed an obligation, to decide constitutional questions independent
of the executive or legislature, a devotion to either of these other
branches would compromise the judiciary’s duty to decide
constitutional issues.381
Fair use exemplifies the potential danger of this improper devotion.
Fair use raises the constitutional question of whether a defendant’s use
merits protection as speech under the First Amendment.382 The role
378
Jefferson Letter, supra note 376, at 364. (“[W]e all know that permanent judges
acquire an Esprit de corps, that being known they are liable to be tempted by bribery,
that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, by a devotion to the
Executive or Legislative; that it is better to leave a cause to the decision of cross and
pile, than to that of a judge biased to one side; and that the opinion of 12 honest
jurymen gives still a better hope of right, than cross and pile does.”) (emphasis
added).
379
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting “judicial power” with Supreme Court
and courts created by Congress); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS 134 (1973) (observing that “judicial power” of Article III is activated when
dispute arises between adverse parties). Justice James Wilson, one of the Framers,
articulated this view as follows: “The independency of each power consists in this,
that its proceedings . . . should be free from the remotest influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the other two powers.” JAMES WILSON, 1 WORKS 299 (R.G. McCloskey ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1967).
380
An example of both the judge and the jury determining whether expression
merits constitutional protection arises in the obscenity context. The jury receives legal
instruction from the judge to determine whether expression is obscene, i.e., whether it
appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive based on community
standards. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977) (explaining role of
jury in obscenity case).
381
See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803)
(setting forth judiciary’s role of deciding constitutional questions).
382
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as “free
speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodations” and suggesting First
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that fair use plays in upholding a defendant’s First Amendment rights
thereby restricts congressional and executive authority to determine
fairness in any particular copyright case.383 Were a judge to defer to
executive or legislative suggestion that a certain defendant’s conduct
was infringing, that deference would compromise her constitutional
duty to determine whether a defendant’s use constitutes speech.
An example of such an improper devotion arises in the Clean Flicks
case discussed above.384 Recall that in Clean Flicks, Judge Matsch
seemed not to comprehend the reasonableness of a contrary inference
in the four-factor analysis, ultimately concluding on summary
judgment that the defendants’ use was not fair.385 During that analysis,
Judge Matsch relied on a House Committee Report, which was drafted
two years after the Clean Flicks suit had commenced, and that Report
indicated a congressional belief that the defendants were committing
infringing acts.386 Judge Matsch did not conceal the fact that this
Report influenced his decision.387
This influence of the legislature on Judge Matsch’s determination of
fairness is most troubling because that determination represents a
decision of constitutional import: the judicial system (through judge
and jury) should have decided whether the defendant’s use merited
protection as an act of speech. And this decision should have been
made independent of congressional opinion on the particular facts at
issue. Judge Matsch’s devotion to the House Committee’s opinion
about the defendants appears to have affected his impartiality in
deciding the constitutional issue of fairness.388
b.

Influence of Personal Bias

The Framers recognized the possibility that a judge’s personal bias
may influence his decision.389 As the Federal Farmer wrote, where a
Amendment violation were Congress to alter “traditional contours” of copyright law).
383
See id.
384
See Clean Flicks of Colo. v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239-41 (D.
Colo. 2006); discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
385
See Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-41.
386
Id. at 1240 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-33(I), at 6-7 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 220, 225) (explaining that House Committee is aware of services and
companies that create fixed copies of movies that make imperceptible limited portions
of audio and video content and that Committee believes such practices to be illegal
under Copyright Act).
387
See id.
388
See id.
389
Federal Farmer, supra note 375, at 354; see also Jefferson Letter, supra note 376,
at 364.
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few hold offices of power, the few are generally disposed to favor
“those of their own description.”390 Even the most ethical of judges
may suffer from this failing: indirectly, perhaps even subconsciously,
the possibility for personal bias exists where one of the parties is
similar to the judge.391 Without realizing it, the judge may consider
that party’s view as the most reasonable view because that party seems
most like the judge.392
Although this bias is difficult to identify in any given case, the
circumstance that creates the potential for the bias is not: one party
looks like the judge.393 That circumstance frequently arises in fair use
cases. Judges are in many ways similar to corporate copyright holders:
both represent the educated elite; both stand in positions of power;
both are sophisticated.394 Compared to a college drop-out or teenage
390

See Federal Farmer, supra note 375, at 354.
Scholarship recognizes the presence of implicit or unconscious bias that can
affect a decisionmaker’s judgment. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,”
and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007) (questioning
whether presence of unconscious bias based on race, gender, and other legally
protected characteristics — pervasiveness of which psychological studies have
demonstrated — affects legally relevant behavior); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1200-01
(2009) (noting white preference among white Americans and observing that scientific
studies “reveal implicit or unconscious bias”). Professor Steven Burton has articulated
the general problem as follows:
391

[T]he problem of improper bias can arise also when judges characterize the
facts in a case. . . . The sifting of evidence is guided at many points by one’s
general beliefs about how the world works, including beliefs about various
classes of people. Stereotypical beliefs can generate inferences from the
evidence to the finding of fact and thereby introduce improper bias in
adjudication.
STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 249-50 (1992).
392
See generally Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV.
10, 14 (1987) (“Regardless of which perspective ultimately seems persuasive, the
possibility of multiple viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and shows
how claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims.”).
393
See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
394
Judge Nancy Gertner aptly observed the disparity between the parties of
copyright suits during a pretrial hearing involving pro se defendants (who argued fair
use) and corporate copyright holders: “There is a huge imbalance in these cases. The
record companies are represented by large law firms with substantial resources. . . .
They bring cases against individuals, individuals who don’t have lawyers and don’t
have access to lawyers and who don’t understand their legal rights.” Transcript of
Motion Hearing at 8, Capital Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass.
June 17, 2008). Noteworthy is the fact that in that case, the copyright holders retained
the law firm where the judge formerly practiced. An attempt to invoke an unconscious
bias? See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 5, Capital Records, Inc. v.
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defendant, the corporate copyright holder looks strikingly similar to
the judge. Their life similarities of age, education, power, social status,
and relative wealth become starkly apparent when lined up against fair
use defendants. These similarities present a danger for bias to
influence the discretionary judgments pervasive in the fair use
analysis. The possibility that similarities between copyright holder and
judge might play into the discretionary nature of fair use cannot be
denied.
It should be noted that the danger of personal bias outlined above is
with respect to the thought process of judges, not the outcomes that
judges reach. Assuming an ethical judiciary, there is no danger that a
judge is consciously favoring the copyright holder in order to ensure
that they prevail.395 Rather, the danger is the temptation to construe
issues from one party’s point of view, or more specifically, to defer,
even if implicitly, to a party’s subjective values that control the
inferences in the four-factor analysis. If a judge must make a
discretionary determination that admits a wide array of opinion, her
thought process may tend to mirror those who are most like her. The
danger here is not that judges are trying to favor one party over the
other. It is that judges are being persuaded to form opinions and
exercise discretion for the party that is most similar in circumstance.
Party similarity in intellect, prestige, or power may subtly influence
judicial thought processes and discretionary opinions.
Thus, by withholding issues in the four-factor analysis from juries,
judges are upending a process for determining fairness that the law
has developed and maintained since the inception of fair use centuries
ago.396 The histories of both the fair use doctrine and the right to a
jury trial demonstrate that the law has carefully and deliberately
developed a system for balancing interests of free speech against
interests of creativity incentives, interests of individuals against
interests of corporations, and interests of objective judgment against
interests of subjective opinion. This system has been a communal
assessment by peers. The dangers of deciding fair use on summary
judgment illustrate the dangers of ignoring the constitutional right to
a jury.
Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2009) (stating that Dwyer & Collora,
LLP represents plaintiff copyright holders); 1 ALMANAC, supra note 110, First Circuit,
at 11 (stating former law firm of Judge Gertner as Dwyer, Collora and Gertner).
395
The fact that large corporations may win more cases than poor individuals in
the fair use context does not by itself raise concern; favoring a party because the law
mandates that outcome is not the danger here.
396
See, e.g., Cary v. Kearsley, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680 (Lord
Ellenborough, C.J.) (submitting issue of fair use to jury).
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B. Right of Speech
The failure of judges to commit fair use issues to a jury creates
another constitutional problem. It threatens a defendant’s speech
rights under the First Amendment. Scholars and courts recognize that
fair use merits constitutional protection: in some circumstances,
repeating another’s expression should be protected as an act of speech,
and where those circumstances exist, the First Amendment — through
the doctrine of fair use — restrains congressional authority to
suppress that repetition.397 Courts have uniformly held that that the
doctrine of fair use contemplates speech interests of defendants, so a
First Amendment challenge to copyright’s suppression of copied
expression must invoke fair use.398 If a copier believes that her interest
in free speech justifies her copying, she must rely on the fair use
doctrine to assert that interest.399 In short, fair use is intended to
satisfy the demands that free speech places on copyright.
In view of the speech nature of fair use, summary judgment is a
particularly inappropriate means to dispose of a fair use argument. As
discussed above, one judge’s opinion on an inference in the fair use
analysis may not reflect the consensus opinion of a jury.400 A risk
therefore exists that summary judgment will foreclose a fair user from
realizing an otherwise meritorious defense. Given the speech nature of
fair use, this risk represents a threat to constitutionally protected
speech.401 By failing to recognize an inference in the fair use analysis, a
judge fails to recognize the possibility that speech is protected. A
judge who disposes of a fair use argument on summary judgment
necessarily ignores the wide disparity of opinion that arises in the
factfinding process of the fair use analysis, and in so doing, the judge
may impose liability on protected speech.
The threat of summary judgment to speech has been recognized in a
speech context similar to fair use — defamation.402 As in fair use, in
397
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as
“free speech safeguard[]” and “First Amendment accommodation[]”); Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 135, at 165-66 (arguing that copying another person’s expression
constitutes speech); Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 135, at 2433-34, 2466-70
(arguing for procedural protections of free speech to apply to fair use expression).
398
See Eldred, 186 U.S. at 219, 221; see, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport
Video, 349 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2003) (“First Amendment concerns in copyright
cases are subsumed within the fair use inquiry.”).
399
See Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“The First Amendment adds nothing to the fair use defense.”).
400
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
401
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
402
See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (questioning
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defamation a defendant’s speech rights turn on a subjective factfinding
process: the factfinder must determine a defamation defendant’s
intent.403 For this reason, courts never entertain a motion for summary
judgment against a defamation defendant. Interestingly, though,
courts have recognized the importance of summary judgments for
defamation defendants on the grounds that the litigation cost of
establishing facts to a jury might force a defendant to self-censor,
introducing a potential for chilling of protected speech.404 By contrast,
where the speech at issue is fair use expression, courts are ready and
willing to rule against a defendant on summary judgment as a pure
matter of law.405
CONCLUSION
Treating fair use as a pure issue of law violates the Seventh
Amendment right to a civil jury and threatens the First Amendment
right of free speech. It sacrifices truth for brevity.406 It destroys the
delicate balance of power between judges and the people.407 It upends
centuries of precedent.408 It thwarts due process.409
These dangers have reached a zenith. Judges have invaded the
constitutional province of the jury, stripping away ordinary citizens
from the process due in cases where the law deprives individual
members of its public of all their property.410 To disguise the invasion,
whether deciding defamation on summary judgment is appropriate, given that
decision requires ruling on actual malice).
403
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
404
See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Ct. App. 1984)
(“[A] motion for summary judgment in First Amendment cases is an approved
procedure because unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect
upon the exercise of First Amendment rights and because speedy resolution of cases
involving free speech is desirable.”); DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267 (N.J.
2004) (justifying summary judgment for defendant in defamation action on grounds
that “threat of prolonged and expensive litigation has a real potential for chilling . . .
criticism and comment”).
405
See discussion supra Part III.C.
406
Or perhaps it sacrifices truth and brevity. See SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS
LEGUM ANGLIAE (IN PRAISE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND) 77 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1949)
(1468) (“[A] jury of twelve citizens is the most powerful and efficient method for
eliciting truth.”).
407
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.b.
408
See discussion supra Part III.A.
409
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
410
See, e.g., Ashby Jones, A Loss for Nesson: BU Student Hit with $675,000 Fine,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 3, 2009, 8:55 EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/08/03/aloss-for-nesson-bu-student-hit-with-675000-fine/ (describing college student’s fine of
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judges have labeled issues of fact as issues of law, altering a traditional
contour of copyright.411 The trend has become so common that judges
are now questioning why in the past the jury was ever involved in the
fair use analysis; they are now calling for the jury’s demise to be
express and unqualified.412 And this rewriting of the jury’s role has left
fair use speech unprotected. The abolition of the jury in fair use has
begotten a constitutional crisis.
It is time, then, to return to the original conception of fair use — as
a fact-intensive inquiry most appropriate for the jury. Judges must
recognize anew the factual nature of the fair use inquiry.413 They must
appreciate that fair use inferences are laden with social value
judgments that are best left to juries.414 Even where inferences seem
obvious, judges must recognize that their own biases and values shape
the framework through which they form opinions of fairness.415 They
must recognize that juries are particularly well suited to form those
opinions. The power of process must be recognized and respected.
Fair use must be an issue of fact for the jury.416

$675,000 where judge denied student opportunity to argue fair use to jury).
411
Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (implying that alteration of
“traditional contours” in copyright law would raise constitutional concern).
412
See Order at 4, Capital Records, Inc. v. Alaujan, No. 1:03-CV-11661-NG (D.
Mass. July 14, 2009) (Gertner, J.) (calling for examination of which institution —
judge or jury — should decide questions of fair use and suggesting that that
institution should be judge).
413
See discussion supra Part IV.
414
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
415
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
416
Cf. Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d
312, 321 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that summary judgment should be employed
“sparingly” in copyright cases that raise issue of substantial similarity).

